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INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals involving Enron Corp., Global Crossing
Ltd., Tyco International Ltd., and WorldCom Inc. (among others)
have focused regulatory, media, and overall public attention on
corporate and individual securities fraud, including insider trading.
1
This focus is driving a new, fast-moving, aggressive regulatory agenda
1. The agenda to date has included, among other things, the adoption by
Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley], and a series of regulatory initiatives at the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.1-205.7
(2003); id. § 240.10A-2 (2003); id. §§ 228.303(c), 229.303(a)(4)-(5), 249.220f (Form
20-F Items 5E-5G), 249.240f (Form 40-F ¶¶ (11)-(13)) (2003). Interestingly,
Professor Stephen Bainbridge predicted this phenomenon with uncanny accuracy,
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consisting principally of proposed changes to public company
accounting practices, corporate governance, and federal securities
2
regulation and fraud enforcement. What a difference a few years
make . . .
It was just two years ago, on July 19, 2001, that Harvey L. Pitt, then
the newly confirmed Chairman of the SEC, announced a
comprehensive review of the SEC’s rules, noting, as reported in The
New York Times on July 20, 2001, that the complexity of the current
rules makes it “difficult for those obliged to comply with the rules to
3
understand their obligations . . .” Soon thereafter, concern over
corporate fraud—together with Chairman Pitt’s deemed ineffectual
(and allegedly biased) management of that issue—stole the
4
spotlight.
While seemingly all but forgotten by some, former
Chairman Pitt’s original regulatory agenda continues to have validity
5
6
in the current environment. In particular, in the insider trading
some might say, in 2000. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1058 n.169 (2000) (“[A] few wellpublicized securities fraud cases could result in the adoption of onerous securities
regulation even if the vast majority of corporate managers are honest and
trustworthy.”).
2. These changes have been heralded and trumpeted by the press from the time
that news of the full extent of Enron Corp.’s corporate fraud first became public.
See, e.g., David Callahan, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A21;
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Leader Evolves Slowly in a Climate Enron Altered, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2002, at C1; David Leonhardt, A Prime Example of Anything-Goes Executive Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at C1; Bruce Nussbaum, Can Trust Be Rebuilt?, BUS. WK., July
8, 2002, at 32; Lee Walczak et al., Let the Reforms Begin, BUS. WK., July 22, 2002, at 26.
3. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Says Rules Need a Review, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2001, at C1.
4. During former Chairman Pitt’s term in office, reports of his ineffectuality
and bias were widely disseminated and analyzed by national and local news media.
See, e.g., Christopher Byron, Congratulations, Bill—Here’s a Friendly To-Do List for the
SEC, N.Y. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at 031 (describing former Chairman Pitt as “hilariously
ineffectual”); Greg Farrell, SEC Chief Discovers Public Relations Can Be the Pits, USA
TODAY, Oct. 14, 2002, at 3B (setting forth a chronology of controversies during
Pitt’s term at the SEC); What Brokers Want From Pitt: How’s the SEC Chairman Doing?,
ON WALL STREET, Oct. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business Library, News Group File
(reporting the results of a survey of brokers regarding their views on former
Chairman Pitt).
5. Interestingly, former Chairman Pitt, himself, publicly admitted that he had
accelerated his original regulatory agenda in the wake of the publicized fraud at
Enron Corporation. See Labaton, supra note 2.
6. The term “insider trading” as used in this Article refers to the classical theory
of insider trading, as opposed to the misappropriation theory adopted by the
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Under the classical
theory of insider trading, liability results from the trading of an issuer’s securities by
an insider while the insider is in possession of “material, nonpublic information.” See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (describing the objectives of this
classical theory of insider trading liability); Trading “on the basis of” material
nonpublic information in insider trading cases, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003)
(defining when a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material
nonpublic information in insider trading cases). Moreover, this Article focuses on
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area, the Pitt regulatory agenda could have represented an extension
of the SEC’s recent foray into rule-making that attempts to bring
more clarity to the murky substance of U.S. insider trading regulation
7
under Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
8
amended (the “1934 Act”). Substantive reform to add clarity to our
federal securities laws and regulations, especially those governing
aspects of securities fraud, is more needed now than ever. Only with
this enhanced clarity can specific actions be proscribed; only with
enhanced clarity can those who violate antifraud provisions be
efficiently prosecuted and convicted or otherwise held accountable or
9
liable.
Moreover, greater substantive clarity in U.S. insider trading
regulation enhances the transaction planning process for public
10
11
issuers of securities and their insiders. A key aspect of U.S. insider
trades (not tips) by primary insiders (not their tippees). For information on tipper
and tippee liability for insider trading, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) [hereinafter Rule 10b-5]. Among other things,
Rule 10b-5 prohibits individuals and entities from directly or indirectly using
interstate commerce, the mail, or a facility of a national securities exchange:
[t]o employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or . . . [t]o
engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit on any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2003).
9. See Mike France & Dan Carney, Why Corporate Crooks Are Tough to Nail, BUS.
WK., July 1, 2002, at 35 (noting that successful prosecution of corporate wrongdoers
is difficult because, among other things, “[t]he laws regulating companies are
ambiguous”).
10. “Public issuers” or “issuers” refers to issuers of publicly traded securities
registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act. Penalties, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2003).
These issuers must comply with the same restrictions on insider trading to which
their insiders are subject under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82
F.3d 1194, 1203-04 (1st Cir. 1996) (conceptualizing, by analogy, corporate issuers as
individual insiders for disclosure purposes); Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The
Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure
Initiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 225, 229 (2002) (discussing generally the duty of
issuers and insiders to disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from
engaging in stock sales and market transactions); Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising
Capital Directly from Investors: What Disclosure Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 111, 116 (2002) (stating that “[a]ll courts and most commentators have assumed
that the issuer of securities is the ultimate insider” for purposes of U.S. insider
trading regulation); Nicholas J. Guttilla, Securities Regulation-Disclosure of Intra-Quarter
Performance Information Constituting Extreme Departure from Public Information Required in
Shelf Registration Prospectus-Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir.
1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1023, 1028-29 (1998) (noting that SEC insider trading
proscriptions apply equally to insiders and corporate issuers); Donna M. Nagy, The
“Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why
Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1177-78 (1999) (describing the
operation of the “disclose or abstain” rule to issuer trading transactions).
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trading regulation that impacts transaction planning is the concept of
materiality. Although materiality is defined using the same, wellknown legal standard for many different purposes under the federal
securities laws, the concept of materiality as implemented in U.S.
insider trading regulation has created unique planning problems for
12
public companies and their insiders. This unique effect results from
the fact that the judicially ordained law of insider trading in the
United States acts as a transactional disclosure rule that, unlike other
disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, provides issuers and
their insiders with no specific disclosure content guidance.
Accordingly, while corporate issuers and their directors and officers
know that they cannot trade when they are in possession of material
undisclosed information, the imprecise existing legal standard
defining what is “material” makes it difficult for those issuers,
13
directors and officers to understand their legal obligations.
This Article argues, based on applicable policy and related
elements of stockholder value, that issuers, insiders, and their legal
advisors, as well as investors and courts, would benefit from
additional guidance in making materiality determinations in the
insider trading context and suggests a method for constructing that
guidance. In so doing, the article does not attempt to challenge the
existing scheme of regulation of insider trading, although certain of
the criticisms and observations made in the article could be used to
mount such a challenge. Rather, the ideas presented in this Article
are designed to work within the confines of the current regulatory
system to make insider trading prohibitions clearer and fairer
through, among other things, the expanded use of per se rules,
14
presumptions, and safe harbor provisions.
11. In U.S. insider trading regulation, the term “insiders” includes an issuer’s
directors and officers, but also includes others with “a relationship of trust and
confidence” to the issuer’s stockholders. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
12. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1028-34 (noting that a public issuer’s
determination of what constitutes material information is complicated by the notion
that the value of corporate disclosure declines when the market is flooded with too
much information); Bochner & Bukhari, supra note 10, at 228 (discussing ways in
which materiality assessments as to financial results often are difficult).
13. See supra note 12; infra Part II (describing the current legal standard defining
materiality and its application in the insider trading context); see generally John M.
Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable
Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (1998) (describing the continually evolving SEC
mandatory disclosure requirements and the difficulty of determining whether a fact
not mandated to be disclosed by an SEC rule is otherwise material to the total mix of
information).
14. An actor’s complete compliance with all terms of a safe harbor provision
ensures that the actor is protected from a violation of the legal rule as to which the
safe harbor is provided. See Christopher Dean Olander & Cynthia L. Spell, Interest
Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal Tax and Securities Laws, 45 MD. L. REV. 21, 58 n.134
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I.

BACKGROUND

At the core of our nation’s insider trading prohibitions is the
notion that public issuers of securities and their insiders cannot trade
in the issuer’s securities while in possession of material nonpublic
information. Accordingly, when a public issuer or one of its insiders
is in possession of undisclosed material information, the issuer or
insider must either disclose the material information before trading
in the issuer’s securities or abstain from trading in the issuer’s
15
securities. This notion, referred to as the “disclose or abstain” rule,
16
is based in decisional law under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and
Rule 10b-5, which interprets Section 10(b). Most insider trading cases
17
are brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
(1986) (“By ‘safe harbor,’ the SEC means that if all conditions of such a rule are met,
compliance with the underlying statutory exemption is assured”); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1336 (7th ed. 1999) (a safe harbor is “an area or means of
protection . . . a provision (as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from
liability or penalty”).
15. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980) (endorsing the
imposition of a corporate insider’s obligation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from market transactions when in
possession of such information); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (imposing a duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or abstain from trading in or recommending the securities while
such information is undisclosed). In 1961, the SEC first articulated the “disclose or
abstain” rule in an enforcement action against a brokerage firm and one of its
partners. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see Nagy, supra note 10, at
1129 (noting the “disclose or abstain” rule was first articulated by the SEC in Cady,
Roberts & Co. and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella); Jennifer
L. Neumann, Insider Trading: Does “Aware” Really Resolve the “Possession” Versus “Use”
Debate?, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 191 (2002). Under the facts in Cady, Roberts &
Co., the partner of the brokerage firm was informed by one of his colleagues (a
board member of the issuer) that the issuer’s board of directors had approved a
reduction in the issuer’s quarterly dividend. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 908.
While in possession of this as-yet-undisclosed information, the partner sold shares of
the issuer held in customer accounts and in trust for his children, and he sold shares
short for his own account. Id. The SEC found facts indicating that the trading
partner had violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 915-17. The “disclose or abstain” rule is
effectively codified in the recently adopted Rule 10b5-1 under the 1934 Act. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2003).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003) [hereinafter Section 10(b)]. Section 10(b)
provides, among other things, that a person or entity may not use interstate
commerce “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Id.
17. The current text of Section 10(b) expressly mentions rules promulgated
under its authority to regulate insider trading (in connection with the applicability of
Section 10(b) to security-based swap agreements). See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). However,
it is not clear from the original text of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, reproduced in
pertinent part supra notes 7 and 16, that the provisions of either are intended to
cover insider trading claims. In fact, a number of scholars note that the drafters of
Section 10(b) did not intend for it to be used for insider trading claims. See, e.g.,
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The definition of the word “material” in the context of the
“disclose or abstain” rule is neither statutory nor static. Moreover,
this materiality definition is not specific to insider trading regulation.
Rather, the definition of the word “material” in the context of the
“disclose or abstain” rule is based on a generic, judge-made legal
standard applicable to materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5
and other elements of disclosure regulation under both the 1934 Act
18
and the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “1933 Act”). This
broadly applicable judicial standard generally requires that a
19
transaction planner or court assess the likelihood that a reasonable
investor (or stockholder) would consider a particular fact or
20
particular information important in making an investment decision.
In the context of insider trading, the investment decision involves a
21
purchase or sale of securities. Alternatively stated, in determining
Michael P. Dooley, Insider Trading: Comment From an Enforcement Perspective, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 319, 319 (1999) (“There is absolutely no evidence in the legislative
history of section 10(b) or accounts of the SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-5 eight years
later that either Congress or the Commission was even thinking about insider trading
as a target of the statute or the rule.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider
Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 70 (2002) (asserting that the 1934 Act
did not prohibit anyone from trading on inside information); Steve Thel, The
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385,
385-86 (1990) (challenging the courts’ misconception of Section 10(b) as a whole).
Since the decision of the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co. and the Second Circuit’s opinion
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have been the principal
sources of insider trading regulation outside the more narrowly tailored areas of
short-swing profit reporting and liability, both of which are governed by Section 16 of
the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2003); see Gevurtz, supra, at 70-72 (providing a brief
and accessible description of the use of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to regulate
insider trading in the United States).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly noted
that materiality determinations in the context of insider trading are to be made using
the same standard that is applicable in other disclosure contexts. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (finding “no authority in the statute,
legislative history, or previous decisions for varying the standard of materiality”).
Lower federal courts have followed this lead. See SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135,
1148 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that insider trading cases use the same standard for
materiality as cases alleging a fraudulent failure to disclose on the part of a
company); Rosenfeld v. Parentcare Ltd., No. 91 Civ. 1956 (KTD), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14532, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1993) (presenting defendants’ argument that the
same materiality standard applies to both Section 10(b) and Section 12 claims).
19. For purposes of this article, the term “transaction planner” includes any
issuer of securities, any insiders of that issuer, and their respective advisors on any
transaction at issue, including without limitation legal counsel.
20. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (adopting the Section 14(a) standard of materiality
established in TSC Indus. for cases brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting forth the
general standard of materiality for use under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act to include those
facts that are substantially likely to be considered important by a reasonable
shareholder in deciding how to vote).
21. In this respect, purchase and sale decisions under Rule 10b-5 are
distinguishable from voting decisions under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. As the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Basic, the materiality standard adopted in TSC
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the materiality of a particular omitted fact, a transaction planner or
court must assess whether there is a substantial likelihood that the
omitted information would affect the “total mix” of market
22
information available. Accordingly, if a fact is substantially likely to
be considered important to a reasonable investor in making an
investment decision (or is substantially likely to affect the total mix of
23
available market information), it is material.
A fact that is not
substantially likely to be considered important to a reasonable
investor in making an investment decision (or is not substantially
likely to affect the total mix of available market information) is not
24
material.
The facial simplicity of the basic legal standard governing
materiality masks the complexities encountered by transaction
25
planners, litigants, the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
26
The
and courts in interpreting and applying that standard.
Industries is fact-sensitive, but it does not provide guidance as to whether and when a
“reasonable investor” would consider a fact significant. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238. Thus,
a reasonable investor may find different information important in the investment
context than in the voting context. See infra note 64.
22. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449); see also TSC
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (concluding that, for an omitted fact to be material, “there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’
of information made available”). The Court apparently views its two statements on
the meaning of materiality (regarding investor importance and the “total mix” of
market information) as alternative formulations of the same legal standard. Some
subsequent courts, however, view them as separate tests or use only one of the two
formulations in describing or assessing materiality. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (referencing investor importance
formulation); SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (referencing investor
importance formulation); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 619 (4th Cir. 1999)
(using “total mix” formulation); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217-18
(1st Cir. 1996) (referencing “total mix” formulation); Nappier v. Pricewaterhouse
Coopers LLP, 227 F. Supp. 2d 263, 273 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002) (referencing the investor
importance formulation); In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 150 (D.
Mass. 2001) (referencing “total mix” and citing to Shaw).
23. See supra notes 20 & 22 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding plaintiff could not show that a one day delay in availability of funds would
have been material in a decision to purchase treasury bills); Feinmann v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that in civil cases customers
failed to show that misrepresentations of transaction fees were material to their
securities transactions).
25. The U.S. Department of Justice has the power and authority to bring criminal
enforcement actions on the basis of violations of Rule 10b-5, including those
involving insider trading. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2003) (providing criminal penalties
for willful violations of the 1934 Act).
26. One commentator notes: “[e]ven with the benefit of the definition,
disclosure decisions are arduous.” Fedders, supra note 13, at 44-45; see Glenn F.
Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the
Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 389-94 (2000)
(highlighting difficulties in interpreting the standard for materiality in light of recent
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interpretation and application of the materiality standard are highly
fact-dependent and do not always produce predictable or certain
27
planning options or judicial results. Moreover, current regulatory
guidance on materiality does not serve to clarify in any meaningful
28
way the interpretation and application of the legal standard. In the
absence of better regulatory guidance, the current legal standard is
inadequate for transaction planning and judicial decision-making.
This current, inadequate regulatory guidance disproportionately
affects the interpretation and application of Rule 10b-5 in the insider
trading context because, in contrast to other areas of disclosure
29
regulation under the securities laws, there are no line-item
disclosure obligations or specific guidelines applicable to issuers and
30
their insiders in complying with the “disclose or abstain” rule.
SEC guidance).
27. These results are memorialized in a dauntingly large, and rapidly growing,
body of decisional law. Over 200 securities fraud class actions were filed in each of
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, many of which involve insider trading or
disclosure claims that implicate materiality issues. See Stanford Law School, Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu (last modified May 31,
2003).
28. See sources cited infra note 32 (regarding the SEC’s failure to more clearly
define materiality); see also Jason Michael Craft, What’s All the Commotion?: An
Examination of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 119, 156 (2001) (commenting that “[o]ne of the largest failures of Regulation
FD is the SEC’s lack of any meaningful guidance or direction as to what information
will be considered material”).
29. Of course, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are antifraud provisions, not mandatory
disclosure rules—rules that call for specific substantive disclosure based on a
transactional or periodic reporting requirement. See, e.g., Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R.
pt. 228 (2003) (containing line-item disclosure rules for small business securities
issuers); see id. pt. 229 (containing line-item disclosure rules for other securities
issuers); see id. pt. 210 (containing specific disclosure requirements for financial
statements). In the insider trading context, however, the “disclose or abstain” rule
has the effect of a macro mandatory disclosure rule. The existence of a duty to
disclose arising out of issuer or insider securities trading activity compels disclosure
of all material nonpublic information before any trade is made. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5-1 (2003) (effectively codifying the “disclose or abstain” rule).
Accordingly, it is appropriate to refer to the regulation of insider trading under Rule
10b-5 as a form of disclosure regulation. See Gerla, supra note 10, at 116-18
(describing an issuer’s duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 generally by reference to
insider trading cases).
30. In fact, although public offerings by issuers, public offerings by insiders, and
tender offers require the filing of comprehensive public disclosure documents under
SEC rules and regulations, the market transaction that typically forms the basis of an
insider trading violation does not trigger a disclosure document filing obligation by
an issuer or insider under the federal securities laws. See Gerla, supra note 10, at 11112 (noting generally an issuer’s “extensive” disclosure requirements for registered
offerings and raising the question, by contrast, as to the disclosures required to be
made by issuers in other contexts, where only Rule 10b-5 is operative). An insider
who is an affiliate for purposes of Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, may be required to
file a Form 144 with the SEC in advance of a sale of securities in order to enjoy the
safe harbor protections of that Rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2003); id.
§ 230.144(h) (2003). The disclosures provided on Form 144, however, relate to the
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Among other things, this failure of guidance may more easily lead to
allegations that there has been a failure of adequate disclosure, even
with thoughtful advance planning.
In fact, the SEC, the federal regulatory agency charged with
31
interpreting and enforcing the U.S. securities laws, purposefully has
left ambiguous the effect of applying the existing materiality standard
32
to any specific factual situation. The high degree of imprecision
inherent in this standard not only creates legal uncertainty and
headaches (sometimes nightmares) for transaction planners,
litigants, enforcement agencies, and courts, but also is inessential to
(and potentially distracts from) achievement of the basic policy goals
underlying the regulation of insider trading under Rule 10b-5, on the
one hand, and those underlying Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the
33
1934 Act as a whole, on the other hand.
Specifically, existing
ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the current
materiality standard in the insider trading context are not necessary
to ensure: (1) the fair and honest operation of the U.S. securities
insider and the proposed securities trading transaction, not the issuer. See SEC Form
144, available at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 7411. Similarly, an insider subject to
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act may be required to report a transaction in the issuer’s
securities by filing a Form 4 or a Form 5 with the SEC after engaging in that
transaction. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (2003). Again, these public filings include
information about insiders and their transactions, but not comprehensive disclosure
regarding the applicable issuers, attributes of their securities, or even the manner of
sale by the insider.
31. The SEC was created under Section 4 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2003).
32. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (“While we acknowledged in the Proposing
Release that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an appropriate
answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of
‘material’ items for purposes of Regulation FD.”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 12, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211)
(“quantifying, in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement is only the
beginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute
for a full analysis of all relevant considerations”); Fedders, supra note 13, at 42
(“[T]he SEC stubbornly refused to promulgate rules designed to fill in the details of
a broadly stated qualitative standard of materiality . . . “); Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1337-38 (1999) (generally noting the SEC’s failure to clarify
insider trading prohibitions and specifically noting ambiguities around the
“probability versus magnitude” materiality test). The reluctance of the SEC to better
define materiality in the insider trading context is unremarkable when viewed in the
light of Congress’s reluctance to statutorily define insider trading as a whole. See
MEREDITH M. BROWN, TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
157-61 (2001) (describing unsuccessful congressional efforts to define insider
trading); RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 4.05
(2002) (noting that the 1934 Act and subsequent legislation “still [do] not contain a
formal definition of insider trading prohibited by Section 10(b)”); THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 661 (4th ed. 2002).
33. See infra Part III.
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trading markets, free from any breach of trust by issuers and their
insiders; (2) the protection of investors and promotion of the
integrity of U.S. securities markets through the prevention of fraud,
manipulation, and deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities; and, (3) the complete and accurate public disclosure of
34
important information about issuers and transactions.
Inherent ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the
existing materiality standard not only are nonessential to the
achievement of applicable policy goals, but also create certain
undeniable negative impacts on stockholder value that may undercut
those policy goals. These impacts include, among other things,
foregone value-enhancing transactions (including issuer offerings
and stock repurchases), management distractions, and outside
35
counsel fees and disbursements. Negative impacts on stockholder
value might be reduced or eliminated if materiality were more
36
precisely defined.
The negative impacts on stockholder value
associated with ambiguities in the interpretation and application of
the current materiality standard are not apparently outweighed by
37
perceived benefits associated with those ambiguities.
Moreover, it is probable that the existing legal standard for
materiality enhances prospects for non-meritorious or marginal,
speculative, settlement-focused, expensive, time-consuming class
action litigation against issuers and their insiders, further eroding
38
stockholder value. Securities fraud class actions are less frequently
39
dismissed than settled. Those that are settled may result in high
34. Id.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra note 149 (regarding the relationship among insider trading,
stockholder value, and investor confidence); see also infra note 218 (regarding overall
benefits of clarity and precision under Rule 10b-5).
37. Nevertheless, these benefits may, in some part, explain the reluctance
exhibited by Congress, the courts, and the SEC to define insider trading. See sources
cited supra note 32 (regarding the SEC’s and Congress’s reluctance to better define
materiality); see sources cited infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (regarding
the possible benefits of ambiguity in statutory construction, interpretation, and
application).
38. See infra Part V (describing the current insider trading class action
environment and the need for substantive reform).
39. See Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: Will
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides?, at http://www.nera.com/wwt/
publications/6143.pdf, at 6 (June 2003) (stating that 80% of federal securities class
actions are settled and approximately 19% are dismissed); Lisa Klein Wager &
Adrienne M. Ward, Securities Class Actions: A Company’s Bad News Gets Worse, BUS. L.
TODAY, July/Aug. 2002, at 15, 16, 18 (explaining that 24% of class actions are
dismissed; 99.5% of the remainder are settled); Richard Painter et al., Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act:
A Post-Enron Analysis 7, at http://www.fedsoc.org/pdf/PSLRAFINALII.PDF (last visited Apr. 22, 2003) (citing a 22.2%
dismissal rate for 2001 and a 25.1% average dismissal rate for cases from 1996-2001);
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dollar-value settlements, paid by the issuer, that ensure to the
detriment of holders of the issuer’s stock at the time the settlement is
paid, who or which may not be entitled to receive an offsetting
41
portion of any settlement amounts as plaintiffs in the class action. A
significant number of securities fraud class actions include insider
42
In many insider trading actions, materiality
trading allegations.
43
determinations have a significant role in the case. Where neither
trading nor possession of nonpublic information is at issue,
materiality becomes the key unproven element of the plaintiff’s
44
claim.
Under these circumstances, existing ambiguities in the
see also Buckberg et al., supra, at 5 (noting that dismissals of securities class actions
have “fallen by a statistically significant measure” since the adoption of SarbanesOxley).
40. Through year-end 2001, the mean and median settlement value of 303
identified settlements of securities class action complaints were $24.9 million and
$5.5 million, respectively.
See Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements, at http://securities.
stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2001/REVIEW_1995-2001.html
(last
modified Mar. 15, 2002); see also Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 7 (identifying and
commenting on mean and median settlement values on an annual basis from 1991
through 2002 and to date for 2003).
41. Plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action are not required to hold the issuer’s
securities during the pendency of the suit. See George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in
Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 894 (1983)
(noting that securities class actions “may produce ‘error costs,’ such as the hindrance
of capital formation, and these costs may ultimately be borne by shareholders, whom
the securities laws are supposed to protect, without necessarily compensating the
victims of the violation of the law.”). Accordingly, they can, and sometimes do, sell
their entire position in the issuer’s securities before a settlement or judgment is
reached in the class action. Moreover, to have standing to bring a private action
under Rule 10b-5, a prospective plaintiff actually must have sold or purchased the
issuer’s securities. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32
(1975) (holding that for the purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, private
damage actions are limited to purchasers and sellers of securities). Therefore,
certain class action plaintiffs may have standing to sue only because they have sold off
their entire positions in the issuer’s securities. Under these circumstances, the
selling security holders would receive their proportionate share of any class action
settlement or judgment and would not be negatively impacted by any payments made
by the issuer.
42. See infra note 206.
43. See sources cited infra note 61; see, e.g., Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540,
555-56 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 65658 (E.D. Va. 2000); Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 90,439 (Feb. 3, 1999). Scienter and materiality often go hand-in-hand in insider
trading cases. See Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of Materiality and
Recklessness in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 55 BUS. LAW. 1023 (2000) (identifying cases in
which the relationship between scienter and materiality is at issue).
44. In such cases, assuming the existence of standing, scienter, reliance, and loss
causation, materiality is the key (if not the only) element of the insider trading claim
at issue in the case. When an issuer or one of its insiders purchases or sells stock in
the market, any omission to state an alleged material fact known by that issuer or
insider is considered to be in connection with that purchase or sale. See Michael P.
Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate
Universe: the Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 182-83
(1995). Moreover, the fact that an insider has traded while in possession of
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interpretation and application of the current materiality standard,
combined with (arguably) plaintiff-friendly procedural aspects of
class actions, act to encourage class action plaintiffs’ counsel to bring
suit (and defendants to settle) in circumstances where the facts raise
any possibility of an insider trading violation. Given the ongoing
debate around procedural reforms in the area of federal class
45
actions, it is time we looked to other ways of clearing court dockets
of speculative insider trading class actions. Additional guidance on
materiality in the context of insider trading could reduce the number
or settlement value of these insider trading class actions.
In short, for a variety of reasons, it now is time for more detailed
interpretive guidance on materiality in the context of U.S. insider
46
trading regulation. If properly crafted, this guidance would do no
nonpublic information may be sufficient to establish the required scienter. See
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing the
evidentiary relationship between allegations of insider trading and scienter);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Insider trading in suspicious
amounts or at suspicious times is, of course, presumptively probative of bad faith and
scienter.”).
45. See, e.g., Robert S. Green, Class Action Reform Does Not Provide ‘Fairness’ to
Anyone, CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP., Feb. 26, 2003, LEXIS, News & Business library,
News Group file; Sean Higgins, Shareholder Suits Near A High Despite ‘95 Reform
Legislation; Dismissals Also Climb, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 10, 2002, LEXIS,
News & Business library, News Group file; Blair A. Nicholas, Restoring Investor
Confidence in the Securities Markets, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 26, 2002, at B-7. The
tension in this debate, especially in the post-Enron era, is between those who argue
that existing procedural rules applicable to securities fraud class actions represent an
unacceptable bar to important, investor-protective class action litigation and those
who contend that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter PSLRA], did not go far enough in curbing attorney-controlled,
speculative, settlement-oriented class action litigation. This same tension, albeit with
different procedural focal points, framed the debate that preceded Congress’s
adoption of the PSLRA. Professor Jill Fisch describes these circumstances well when
she writes:
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . reflects an
innovative congressional effort to refine securities fraud class actions. In
adopting the PSLRA, Congress recognized that although the class action is a
valuable tool for increasing plaintiff access to the legal system, its structure
presents opportunities for abuse. In particular, collective action problems
and small claimant stakes limit plaintiff participation in litigation decisions.
Decisions are made by entrepreneurial lawyers who effectively control the
litigation. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have a substantial interest in the litigation—
frequently a larger interest than any individual class member. Lawyer control
of class actions coupled with the potential divergence between the interests
of the lawyers and those of the class creates a risk that litigation decisions will
not reflect the best interests of the plaintiff class or society as a whole.
Jill E. Fisch, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Aggregation, Auctions, and Other
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 53, 53 (2001) (footnote omitted).
46. This Article focuses on the role of materiality in U.S. insider trading
regulation. With increased and highly publicized allegations of corporate fraud,
which are frequently accompanied by allegations of insider trading, this focus is
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violence to applicable policy and would enhance predictability and
certainty in the application of Rule 10b-5 in the insider trading
context. This enhanced predictability and certainty would come
from the identification and analysis of key areas of disclosure in
which materiality guidance should be provided and the construction
of sufficiently detailed guidance in a disciplined, thorough manner
based on applicable policy and existing regulatory principles.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in six additional parts,
followed by a conclusion. Part II describes the current legal standard
defining materiality and its application in the insider trading context,
including by way of analysis of two sample fact patterns. Part III
identifies key regulatory policies underlying Rule 10b-5 and the 1934
Act, in general and in the insider trading context, and shows that
these policies do not dictate imprecise materiality guidelines in the
insider trading context.
Part IV illustrates how the lack of
predictability and certainty in interpreting and applying the existing
legal standard for determining materiality for insider trading
purposes may impact stockholder value. Part V describes the current
securities fraud class action litigation environment, both generally
and as it relates to insider trading cases, and contends that
ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the existing
materiality standard contribute to a drain on stockholder value
created by continued speculative and abusive class action litigation.
Part VI suggests an approach that can be used in more precisely
defining materiality in the insider trading context, consistent with
applicable policy and existing regulatory principles. The suggested
approach is designed to enhance predictability and certainty in the
interpretation and application of the existing materiality standard,
warranted. See Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive
Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 298 (1999) (analyzing the relative
importance of insider trading allegations and private actions after the PSLRA); see
also infra note 206. Materiality is, however, omnipresent in the antifraud and
disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
endorsed a uniform materiality standard. See sources cited supra note 18. The
author, therefore, acknowledges that materiality guidance in the context of U.S.
insider trading regulation also would have an undeniable effect on materiality
analyses under Rule 10b-5 generally and in other federal securities law disclosure
contexts. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 32 (noting
observations about the potential effect of materiality guidance offered for a limited
purpose on the overall interpretation and application of the materiality standard).
Any such effect would, in the author’s view, be desirable, even if the grounds for
enhanced guidance in other contexts are not as compelling as those supporting
enhanced guidance in the insider trading context. While the rationale for enhanced
materiality guidance is most strong in the insider trading area, much of the
argument set forth in this Article applies equally to other areas of antifraud and
disclosure regulation under the federal securities laws, especially other areas under
Rule 10b-5.
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thereby reducing negative impacts and inefficiencies created by the
imprecision of that standard. Part VI also provides examples that
illustrate the suggested drafting approach, drawn from the fact
patterns first used in Part II.
II. MATERIALITY AND INSIDER TRADING
A. Two Examples; One Key Question
The highly significant role of materiality in insider trading
regulation is best understood by reference to specific facts and
circumstances.
Consider, as examples, the two fact patterns
47
described below, each of which represents trading by an insider
while in possession of one or more different types of undisclosed
48
information.
1.

Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting
The first example involves the exercise of employee stock options
and the public sale of underlying shares of common stock of a
Corporation by the Corporation’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) at
a time when the Corporation’s publicly available financial statements
47. Although the examples posit that the trading transaction, in each case, has
been effected by an insider, the examples easily could have been focused around
issuer trading transactions without implicating any change in the legal analysis, since
the same “disclose or abstain” rule applies to issuers and their insiders. See sources
cited supra note 10. One might question, however, whether the legal analysis for
issuers and insiders should be the same. See Gerla, supra note 10, at 118 (noting that
several scholars have questioned the premise that issuers are insiders when they trade
in their own securities). The impacts on stockholder value described infra Part IV,
for example, are most compelling when the issuer, rather than an insider, engages in
the subject trading transaction. In fact, insider trading legislation in a number of
countries only regulates trading by insiders, not the issuer. See, e.g., Canada
Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-32, §§ 100(1), 100(4) (1970) (Can.) (proscribing
action by an “insider,” defined without reference to the issuer); Criminal Justice Act,
c. 36, § 52 (1993) (Eng.) (specifying liability for “[a]n individual who has
information as an insider”); Heinz-Dieter Assmann, The United Kingdom, in GERHARD
WEGEN & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE, CURRENT
STATUS 33, 42-43 (1994) (describing then-existing U.K. insider trading legislation);
James N. Dudley & Ken Casey, Luxembourg, in GERHARD WEGEN & HEINZ-DIETER
ASSMANN, INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE, CURRENT STATUS 171, 173-74 (1994)
(describing then-existing Luxembourg insider trading legislation). Arguments for
the application of different legal standards to analyses of insider trading and issuer
trading, while intriguing, are beyond the scope of this Article.
48. The two examples set forth in this Part have been chosen because they
represent somewhat typical fact patterns that raise interesting interpretive issues.
Examples that lend themselves to a more simple analysis (i.e., where nonpublic
information is certainly material or obviously immaterial) are not the subject of this
article. As to these simple examples, the legal standard governing materiality does its
job well enough; the lack of clarity and precision in that legal standard should not
result in the transaction costs and other detriments described in this article under
those circumstances.

HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

10/28/2003 2:09 PM

1146

[Vol. 52:1131

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

do not fairly present the financial position of the Corporation in
49
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
The Corporation assembles and markets computer hardware and
has experienced very rapid growth.
Transactions in the
Corporation’s common stock are quoted on the NASDAQ National
Market System. The Corporation’s filings with the SEC indicate that
an investment in its common stock carries certain identified risks,
each of which is set forth in detail in these filings. The described
risks include many generalized cautionary statements regarding the
financial condition of the Corporation.
The Corporation misapplies an accounting rule and consequently
misrepresents the adequacy of certain balance sheet reserves in its
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for its third fiscal quarter. As is
typical with Forms 10-Q, the Corporation’s Form 10-Q underwent
only a limited, informal review by the Corporation’s independent
auditors. The misrepresentations in the Form 10-Q result in the
Corporation overstating its assets as shown in its Form 10-Q balance
sheet by $6.8 million, representing 2% of the Corporation’s total
assets. The misrepresentations are identified and corrected in
connection with the Corporation’s preparation of its next Annual
Report on Form 10-K, as to which the Corporation’s independent
auditors perform a full audit review, at which time the Corporation
also files an amended and restated Form 10-Q for its preceding fiscal
quarter.
During the time that the Corporation’s publicly disclosed assets are
overstated, the Corporation’s CFO, who knew, or should have known,
at that time of the overstatement of the Corporation’s assets, (a)
exercises options for the purchase of the Corporation’s common
stock that had been granted to her by the Corporation and (b) sells
the shares acquired upon exercise of the options in the market. The
CFO files in a timely manner the required Form 144 and makes all
required filings regarding the stock sale in accordance with Section
16(a) of the 1934 Act.
2.

Example #2—Failed merger discussions
A second example involves securities trading by Target’s directors
in the public market in the wake of undisclosed discussions regarding
the acquisition by Acquiror, a large, publicly traded corporation, for

49. The facts regarding materiality set forth in this example are based in part on
the facts found by the court in Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir.
1997).
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cash, of Target, an issuer with common stock traded on the New York
50
Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”).
In July, Acquiror offers to acquire Target at a price of $9.50 per
share. This offer follows two other undisclosed acquisition proposals
made by Acquiror to Target in the preceding 18 months. After
consideration of the July offer by Target’s board of directors, Target
rejects the offer as unfair to Target and its stockholders. Neither
Acquiror nor Target then discloses to the public either the offer or its
rejection.
In mid-October of the same year, Acquiror again offers to acquire
Target, this time at a price of $10.50 per share. This revised offer
represents a 79% premium over the then current closing price of
Target’s common stock on the NYSE. After consideration of this
revised offer by Target’s board of directors, Target again rejects as
unfair Acquiror’s revised offer in late October. At this time, neither
Acquiror nor Target publicly discloses the pre-July proposals, the July
offer and rejection, or the October offer and rejection.
In March and April of the following year, three directors of Target
acquire shares of Target in the public market. Each director makes
all required filings regarding the share purchases in accordance with
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act. Late in April, after these purchases
have been made, Acquiror publicly discloses the July and October
offers, and Target immediately responds by publicly disclosing its
rejection of the July and October offers as unfair to Target and its
stockholders. The disclosures cause Target’s stock price to increase
fifty percent over a two-day period (from $6.00 per share to $9.00 per
share).
In early May, Acquiror commences an unsolicited tender offer for
the shares of Target at a price of $10.50 per share. In early June,
Target announces that it has agreed to be acquired by Acquiror for
50. This example is based on publicly reported facts relating to premerger
discussions and disclosures of Sara Lee Corporation and Chock Full O’Nuts
Corporation in 1998 and 1999, resulting in the eventual acquisition of Chock Full
O’Nuts by Sara Lee. See generally Company News: Chock Full O’Nuts Agrees To Sweetened
Sara Lee Offer, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at C4; Company News: Sara Lee To Pursue Its
Hostile Bid For Chock Full O’Nuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1999, at C4; Edward Wyatt, Chock
Full O’Nuts Shares Bought After Merger Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at C3; Company
News: Chock Full O’Nuts Says It Rejected Offer From Sara Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at
C3; James P. Miller, Chock Full O’Nuts Executive Draws Fire For Not Disclosing Sara Lee
Overtures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1999, at B16; Schedule 13D of Sara Lee Corporation,
filed Apr. 22, 1999, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/20041/
0000950172-99-00046 (last visited May 31, 2003) (disclosing, among other
information, Sara Lee’s acquisition of more than five percent of a class of equity
securities of the Chock Full O’ Nuts Corporation as required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d1(a) (2003)).
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common stock of Acquiror with a then current market value of
$11.00 per share.
3.

The materiality question
Did the officer and directors who traded securities as described in
the foregoing two examples conduct those trading transactions while
in possession of material nonpublic information in violation of the
insider trading prohibitions under Rule 10b-5? The officer and each
of the directors are corporate insiders; each traded in the company’s
securities (each sold or bought common stock), and each had
possession of nonpublic information (specifically, an undisclosed
inadequacy of reserves and overstatement of assets in Example #1 and
nonpublic information regarding unsolicited acquisition offers in
Example #2). Accordingly, assuming satisfaction of the other
51
elements of a Rule 10b-5 insider trading cause of action, the
determination as to whether the CFO (in example #1) and directors
(in Example #2) violated Rule 10b-5 rests on an assessment of the
52
materiality of the nonpublic information possessed by each. The
key question: what is “material?”
B. The Applicable Legal Standard
At the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, a “Sorting
53
Hat” is used to assign students to their respective rooming houses.
51. Like other cases under Rule 10b-5, the elements of an insider trading claim
generally are acknowledged to include: a misstatement (or an omission at a time
when there exists a duty to speak) or another element of fraud or deception,
materiality, scienter, causation, reliance, and damages. SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp.
596, 620 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Susan A. Wetzel, New Rule 16b-3: The SEC’s Attempt
to Aid Insiders by Revising Rule 16b-3 is Much Ado About Nothing, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
125, 143 (1998) (listing common elements of insider trading claims). These
elements are difficult to apply in the insider trading concept. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 946 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that this
scheme is more effective for combating false publicity and other frauds that involve
misrepresentation or nondisclosure). Accordingly, elements of an insider trading
claim also have been described in a more tailored fashion. See Colby v. Hologic, Inc.,
817 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D. Mass. 1993) (“The essential elements of an insider trading
claim as generally derived from Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 15253 (1972), include: (1) trading in securities by corporate insiders (2) while
withholding material inside information (3) which they have a duty to disclose to the
investor public.”).
52. See sources cited supra notes 49 & 51 (regarding the relationship between
materiality and the other necessary elements for private actions under Rule 10b-5,
each of which—other than materiality—are assumed to be both existent and
demonstrable in Example #1 and Example #2).
53. Readers familiar with the Harry Potter series of children’s books will
recognize the references in this paragraph to the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and
Wizardry and the Sorting Hat as being from that series. Except as otherwise noted,
the information in the first paragraph of Part II.B is from J. K. ROWLING, HARRY
POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117-22 (1997).
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When placed upon the head of each new Hogwarts student, the
Sorting Hat shouts out the name of the house to which the student
54
then is assigned. The determination made by the Sorting Hat is
unqualifiedly conclusive; by its own admission, the Sorting Hat has
55
not yet been wrong.
Materiality is the Sorting Hat embedded in many disclosure rules
under the federal securities laws, including the “disclose or abstain”
rule that operates in the area of securities fraud, including insider
56
trading regulation. Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact,
whether in accordance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud
rules, the materiality of that particular fact determines whether an
57
individual or entity is obligated to disclose that fact. Either the fact
is material and must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not
58
be disclosed. Stated differently, where materiality is used to qualify a
disclosure obligation, it is a key device that sorts information required
59
to be disclosed from that which is not required to be disclosed. In
those circumstances, the law addresses only two options—“material”
and “not material.” Unfortunately, application of the current
standard for determining materiality frequently yields a third result—
”possibly material.” While, perhaps, tolerable in circumstances
involving the use of materiality as a disclosure determinant in
54. See id. (describing the Hat’s power to magically sort children).
55. J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 177 (2000).
56. As the authors of one popular securities regulation casebook note:
Materiality is a controlling concept when there are allegations of fraud.
While the fraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not impose a duty
to disclose information simply because it is material, they do require
affirmative disclosure of material information in certain circumstances. And
they bar both material misstatements and half-truths whenever information
is given to investors.
COX ET AL., supra note 51, at 39.
57. See generally id. at 39-40 (explaining the materiality is more critical in
ambiguous disclosure decisions than in line-item disclosure for SEC filings).
58. See generally Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 732-36 (1989) (discussing the overall
relationship between materiality and disclosure).
59. Note that, as a general matter, materiality is necessary, but not sufficient, as a
disclosure regulator. A duty to disclose also must exist. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
misleading under Rule 10b-5.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Corporate Accountability:
Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 459 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“At least since Chiarella v. United
States, it is clear that no duty to disclose arises simply because a trader or issuer
possesses material nonpublic information.”). In the insider trading context,
however, the very fact that the corporation or one of its insiders is trading in the
issuer’s securities gives rise to that duty under the “disclose or abstain” rule of the
Chiarella case. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (noting that
the duty to disclose comes from the relationship of trust and confidence between the
insiders and the issuer’s stockholders).
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connection with narrowly tailored line-item disclosure obligations,
this element of uncertainty is more troublesome in the insider
trading context (and Rule 10b-5 disclosure cases generally) because
60
of its wholly outcome-determinative nature. The difference between
materiality and immateriality in these cases often means the
61
difference between liability and no liability. If only materiality were
as precise a sorting device as the Hogwarts Sorting Hat . . .
The word “material,” as used in the “disclose or abstain” rule under
Rule 10b-5, is not defined in the 1934 Act or the rules and regulations
62
under the 1934 Act. Moreover, the SEC has adopted little in the way
63
of guidance as to the substance of the definition. Accordingly, the
standard governing materiality largely has been left to judicial
determination and interpretation. For over fourteen years, there has
been a single, judicially created and construed, legal standard
applicable to materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5. This
materiality standard is set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
64
Inc. and was explicitly held applicable to cases brought under Rule
60. See Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (2d Cir.
1991) (“The central issue at trial was whether the April and October projections
constituted material facts that had to be disclosed under the federal securities laws.”);
see also sources cited infra note 61.
61. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe
for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 411 (1984) (“An insider trading case
often turns on whether particular information, allegedly not generally available to
the market, was material.”). Overall, the role of materiality in disclosure regulation is
a large one. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 823 (1995) (“The important difference between materiality in
the free-standing context as addressed by the Court and materiality in the disclosure
and insider-trading contexts is that in the latter contexts materiality has meaning.”);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases
and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 631 n.5 (1997) (“[M]ateriality and
risk disclosure is at the heart of disclosure regulation, especially with respect to
potential liability for fraud or nondisclosure.”).
62. See Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea: An Analytic Comparison Between
Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497, 531 (2001) (explaining that
there is no statute defining materiality). Rule 12b-2 under the 1934 Act does define
the word “material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject” (i.e., for the purpose of line-item mandatory disclosure
rules) by reference to the materiality standard articulated in TSC Indus. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2003); see id. § 230.405 (including
an analogous definition relating to mandatory disclosure rules under the 1933 Act).
The Rule 12b-2 definition does not apply to disclosures made under the insider
trading “disclose or abstain” rule. Id. § 240.12b-2 (2002).
63. See sources cited supra note 32; see also infra note 250.
64. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. TSC Industries was not an insider trading case
brought under Rule 10b-5. Rather, the case involved a misleading proxy statement
and alleged a violation of Rule 14a-9 under the 1934 Act. The ambiguities inherent
in the TSC Industries materiality standard likely are largely responsible for the
relatively effortless importation of the standard from the Rule 14a-9 context to the
Rule 10b-5 context. Without the flexibility arising from these ambiguities, there
would be some illogic to having the same standard for two wholly separate rules that
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65

10b-5 in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson. As defined in TSC Industries (and
applied in Basic):
[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote. This standard . . . does
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure
of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable
investor to change his vote. What the standard does
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made
66
available.
In addition to expressly adopting the materiality standard set forth
in the TSC Industries case, the Basic Court formulated a test for
interpreting and applying this legal standard in the context of
preliminary corporate merger discussions, thereby resolving a circuit
67
split on the appropriate materiality analysis in that factual context.
protect investors from fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with two
distinct types of investment decision. In the Rule 14a-9 context, stockholders are
protected from fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with a voting
decision.
In the Rule 10b-5 context, investors are protected from fraud,
manipulation, and deception in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9 (2003). That which is important to a stockholder in
deciding how to vote may be very different from that which is important to an
investor in deciding whether to purchase or sell.
65. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988) (declaring the TSC
Industries materiality definition the official standard for all Rule 10b-5 claims).
66. 426 U.S. at 449.
67. Prior to the advent of the Basic case, two principal judge-made tests had been
developed and used by federal circuit courts of appeal in the context of premerger
discussions: the “agreement-in-principle” test and the “probability versus magnitude”
test. To this developed body of law, the federal appellate court hearing the Basic case
added a third, new test: the “materiality by denial” test. The “agreement-inprinciple” test was developed in the Third Circuit. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742
F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984). Under this test, merger discussions do not become
material until an agreement-in-principle is reached by the parties as to price and
transaction structure. The “probability versus magnitude” test was articulated by the
Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), and
applied to preliminary merger discussions in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39,
47-48 (2d Cir. 1976). The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this test in Basic. The
“materiality by denial” test was formulated by the Sixth Circuit in its first decision in
the Basic case. 786 F.2d 741, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986). Under this test, “once a
statement is made denying the existence of any [merger] discussions, even
discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material
because they make the statement made untrue,” thereby merging the determination
of the falsity of the disclosed information with its materiality. Id.
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Under Basic, the materiality of premerger discussions is assessed
based on a balancing of the probability of occurrence of the
proposed merger transaction against the expected magnitude of the
68
transaction to the issuer.
This test maybe referred to as the
69
“probability versus magnitude” test.
Although use of the TSC Industries materiality standard in Rule 10b5 cases is well settled, its interpretation and application (both as a
70
general matter and in specific factual scenarios) often are not clear.
Many pages of judicial and scholarly ink have been spent assessing
the conceptual or contextual importance or significance of a wide
71
variety of facts and events, the nature of a “reasonable shareholder”
72
or “reasonable investor,” and the composition of a “total mix” of
68. 485 U.S. at 238-39.
69. See, e.g., id. at 239 n.16 (describing the test as the “probability/magnitude
approach of Texas Gulf Sulfur”); see also Erin M. Hardtke, Comment: What’s Wrong
with the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements? A Call to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
133, 159 (1997) (referencing “the probability versus magnitude test”); Edward A.
Fallone, The Clinton Court is Open for Business: The Business Law Jurisprudence of Justice
Stephen Breyer, 59 MO. L. REV. 857 (1994) (citing to “the ‘probability versus
magnitude’ test set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1998)”).
70. One scholar notes:
Ambiguous legal standards governing disclosure ensure that even honest
managers will cause some fraudulent omissions. Corporate managers and their
counsel assessing the “materiality” of a given fact receive little guidance from the
courts. Disclosing a potential problem or opportunity may look deceptive in
hindsight if the event does not come to pass, but omitting that fact will certainly
look deceptive if the event does occur. The materiality requirement protects the
corporation from having to disclose every potential eventuality. Materiality
determinations, however, are among the most difficult faced by securities lawyers
and their clients, and additional disclosures may give the corporation's
competitors important information. Disclosure errors are inevitable.
A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1999) (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a major
factor in determining whether information was material is the importance attached
to it by those who knew about it”); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485,
489 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that “generally earnings projections of a company
constitute a prime factor in estimating the worth of its stock, especially when made
close to the end of the fiscal year” and therefore are material); Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79
F. Supp. 2d 610, 618 (E.D. Va. 1999) (listing “[e]xamples of events in the life of a
corporation that are material and which an insider is duty-bound to disclose”).
72. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 636-39 (1988) (referencing the average
small investor); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that “[r]easonable investors do not want to know everything that could
go wrong, without regard to probabilities; [because]that would clutter registration
documents and obscure important information . . .” and implying that “professional
traders and investors” may be an appropriate audience for certain corporate
disclosures); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 (“[S]peculators and chartists of
Wall and Bay Streets are also ‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal
protection afforded conservative traders”); Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary:
Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1998) (stating

HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

2003]

MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING

10/28/2003 2:09 PM

1153

73

information, among other things, in order to determine whether a
74
particular fact is or was required to be disclosed. Unfortunately,
however, applicable decisional law and scholarship often do not
permit a definitive determination as to the materiality of facts or
75
events, even if recurring. Accordingly, the widespread acceptance of
the TSC Industries standard is of small comfort.
Attempts to more clearly define materiality for various federal
76
securities law purposes, both before and after Basic, have failed.
These failures may be attributable to concerns that the task is too
77
fact-dependent, seemingly making the job too difficult. The failures
that “investors are not homogeneous”); Miller, supra note 26, at 384 (noting the
difficult and dynamic nature of the “reasonable” investor part of the materiality
standard).
73. See, e.g., Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1533 (2d Cir.
1991) (exploring the meaning of the “total mix” formulation); Wielgos, 892 F.2d at
518 (articulating a truth-on-the-market argument for use by defendants in arguing
immateriality on the basis that “the market had in its possession all significant
information”); Dennis, supra note 61, at 419 (contending that the “efficient market
model . . . quantifies the total mix concept”).
74. When a court is assessing materiality, these judgments typically are made on
the basis of all information then made available to the court, including facts not in
the possession of the issuer or its counsel at the time disclosure assessments are
made. For example, the very fact that an insider of an issuer trades in the issuer’s
securities may be seen as an indication of the materiality of undisclosed merger
discussions. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Moreover, “[w]here
appropriate, courts assessing the materiality of nonpublic information also can
consider what actually transpired following disclosure.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see Daniel J.
Bacastow, Comment, Due Process and Criminal Penalties Under Rule 10b-5: The
Unconstitutionality and Inefficiency of Criminal Prosecutions for Insider Trading, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 96, 108 (1982) (“While courts that make the assessment [of
materiality] . . . from a position of hindsight, the insider must follow this calculus
without the certainty that such hindsight provides.”). But see Reiss v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[H]indsight is of limited value and the
fact that the ultimate disclosure of the negotiations affected stock price is not
compelling.”).
75. Many commentators discount, ignore, or dispute the significance of the
ambiguity of the current materiality standard, presumably because many reported
cases involve unambiguously material or immaterial facts. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried,
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through PreTrading Disclosure, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 303, 336 (1998) (“[I]n practice, lower courts have been reluctant to find
information ‘material’ unless it concerns a ‘bombshell event’ . . .”); Marleen A.
O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section
16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 364 (1989) (“To date, most insider trading cases have
involved information that was clearly meaningful to the rational investor.”). A focus
on reported cases ignores the reality of class action securities litigation described in
greater detail in Part V—that plaintiffs frequently bring insider trading claims as
nuisance suits (where the objective of the lawsuit is early, lucrative settlement, rather
than vindication on the merits at trial). Accordingly, the ambiguity of the existing
materiality standard should be assessed through an examination not only of reported
cases but also of cases brought and dismissed or settled before or during trial.
76. See BROWN, supra note 32, at 157-61; see generally Anne L. Barragar, Disclosure of
Preliminary Merger Negotiations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 WASH. L. REV. 81, 94 (1987)
(noting that commentators have called for quantifiable materiality standards).
77. See Barragar, supra note 76, at 92, 94 (discussing various problems associated
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also may result from fears that a bright-line test would result in one of
at least three potentially undesirable outcomes, namely: (1) issuers
and their insiders interested in trading while in possession of
arguably material nonpublic information then would have a clear
78
roadmap to trade for personal gain without liability; (2) issuers and
insiders would be discouraged from buying, holding and selling the
79
issuer’s securities; or (3) issuers and insiders would be forced to
disclose an overwhelming amount of information, much of it not
80
important to investors. In Basic, the Court rejected a bright-line test
then utilized by a number of courts in assessing the materiality of
81
premerger discussions and negotiations. The Basic court scorned
this bright-line test in part because it assumed investors are not
intelligent or sophisticated enough to understand the subtleties of
82
speculative disclosure regarding a possible acquisition transaction.
with defining more precisely the materiality of merger negotiations).
78. This argument has been made with respect to defining insider trading
generally. See generally George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the
Propriety and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
185, 194-95 (2001) (noting that “[a]s the law currently stands, a defendant may be
liable for insider trading on the basis of a transaction, the wrongfulness of which was
not apparent at the time it was contemplated and executed.”). This concern is
understandable in that current deterrence of insider trading, even with an
ambiguous, judge-made standard defining materiality, is not totally effective. See
Fried, supra note 75, at 331-32 (“For although the penalty for violating Rule 10b-5
can be quite severe, there are many situations in which the probability of
apprehension and punishment is very low.”).
79. The reasoning of those who may have this concern likely is focused on
unease about the potential materiality threshold resulting from application of any
bright-line test. The argument here is that Congress, the SEC, or the courts would
adopt a bright-line test for materiality in the insider trading context that is overinclusive, effectively making illiquid any insider holdings in an issuer’s securities
(since the issuer is unlikely to volunteer disclosure of all material information at all
times, especially under that rule). Interestingly, however, application of the existing
formulations of the materiality standard may have the same effect for those officers
and directors that are conservative decision makers. These insiders may decide, for
example, that they would prefer not to hold the issuer’s securities if they cannot buy
and sell those securities relatively freely. See O’Connor, supra note 75, at 365-66
(“Like any general standard, the absence of precise contours . . . will deter lawful as
well as unlawful behavior.”); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 413 (1991) (“Legal
sanctions are imprecise, and any effort to prevent insiders from buying stock on the
basis of inside information risks discouraging insiders from buying stock at all.”); see
also infra note 105.
80. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231, 233 (1988) (referencing the TSC
Industries opinion, 426 U.S. at 448-49, which asserted that a low materiality threshold
would cause issuers “simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision making.”).
81. See id. at 233-37 (explaining that the test determined merger negotiations to
be material only when there had been an agreement in principle as to price and
structure).
82. See id. at 234 (“The agreement-in-principal test assumes investors are
nitwits . . . unable to appreciate that mergers are risky propositions up until the
closing.”).
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Most recently, a task force of the Section of Business Law
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar
Association has recommended a more rigorous approach to the
83
concept of materiality in the context of Regulation FD. The task
force notes:
The concept of materiality may be too blunt and imprecise a
standard to trigger affirmative disclosure obligations . . . At
the same time that uncertainties regarding materiality can
reduce the flow of information, at least as to quality, they can
lead to a profusion of detail, which can obfuscate and
confuse, rather than inform, the investing public. Disclosure
is most helpful to the investing public when it is focused,
84
understandable and easily accessible.
In two recent pronouncements, the SEC has explicitly avoided
adoption of a more precise definition of materiality in its rule-making
and public guidance. In fact, both the promulgating release for
Regulation FD (and Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2), published in August
85
2000, and SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, released in August
86
1999, expressly reaffirm (in the context of selective and financial
disclosure, respectively) the continued applicability of the existing,
imprecise, TSC Industries standard defining materiality. Additionally,
the SEC declined to offer sufficient guidance as to what is and is not
87
material under Rule 10b-5. In the Regulation FD release, the SEC
83. 17 C.F.R. 243.100-243.103 (2002); see American Bar Association Section of
Business Law Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities Report on Regulation FD, THE
SEC. REP., Spring 2002, 11, 14, at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/fedsec/sec_
reporter/sec7-1.pdf (proposing and analyzing possible alternative approaches to a
more precise definition of materiality for use in making determinations under
Regulation FD) [hereinafter Reg. FD Report]; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (noting the pitfalls of selective disclosure but rejecting
the adoption of a bright-line test for materiality); John Tishbi, Comment, Regulation
FD: The Year That Passed and the Years Ahead, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2002)
(presenting various criticisms of the SEC’s use of the existing common law standard
for materiality, as supplemented by a non-exclusive list of information that may be
material, as noted infra note 250).
84. Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 14; see Anthony T. Horgan, Comment,
Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective Disclosure High Wire, 46 VILL. L. REV. 645,
656 n.71 (2001) (sampling and characterizing comments on proposed Regulation
FD).
85. Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
86. 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999); see Miller, supra note 26 (providing an
interesting description and critique of this Bulletin). A Staff Accounting Bulleting
(“SAB”) reflects the views held by the staff of the SEC regarding the disclosure of
accounting-related practices.
87. See sources cited supra notes 85-86. In both the Staff Accounting Bulletin and
its release on Regulation FD, the SEC does list types of information that may help
determine materiality, but neither the bulletin nor the release goes further than that
in giving materiality guidance. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000); 64 Fed.

HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

10/28/2003 2:09 PM

1156

[Vol. 52:1131

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

reasoned that the materiality standards set forth in the applicable
decisional law “encompass the necessary flexibility to fit the
88
circumstances of each case,” and any bright-line rule “must
89
necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.”
C. Materiality Analysis in Insider Trading Cases
The concept of materiality is critically important to insider trading
analysis because undisclosed information always exists and securities
90
trading by an issuer or one of its insiders triggers a duty to disclose.
When a corporate issuer desires to proceed with a transaction in the
issuer’s securities, the issuer’s board of directors must identify the
nonpublic facts in the issuer’s possession, determine the materiality
or immateriality of those facts, and consider the potential effects
(positive or negative) of the possible public disclosure of those facts
91
that are material.
Based on this process of identification and
consideration, the issuer can determine whether the desired
securities trading transaction requires disclosure of any facts then in
its possession, and, if so, whether it is willing or able to disclose those
92
facts and proceed with the transaction. The concept of materiality is
93
undeniably significant in the issuer’s analysis.
When an insider
desires to proceed with a transaction in the issuer’s securities, the
insider must identify the nonpublic facts in the insider’s possession
94
and determine their materiality or immateriality.
If the insider
determines that the undisclosed facts then in the insider’s possession
are material, absent cooperation from the issuer in the transaction,
Reg. at 45, 150 (Aug. 19, 1999); see also infra note 250.
88. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 51, 721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)).
89. See id.; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 565 (1992) (referencing the “familiar suggestion that rules tend to be
over- and under-inclusive relative to standards”). One might argue that this
deference to the judicial standard in determining materiality is part of a strategy
employed by the SEC to enhance its own power by preserving enforcement and rulemaking flexibility. See Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State
Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
681, 698 (2003) (noting that the SEC generally may behave in this manner).
90. See sources cited supra notes 59 (regarding the duty to disclose) & 61
(regarding the importance of the concept of materiality to insider trading analysis).
91. See sources cited supra note 70 (commenting on the management decision
process in this context).
92. See id.; see also sources cited infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing
the relative inability of insiders to trade securities given the omnipresence of
material, nonpublic facts).
93. See sources cited supra note 61 (emphasizing the importance of the concept
of materiality in disclosure regulation).
94. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of
the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984) (describing different
approaches to ascertaining property rights in corporate information).
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95

the insider must forego the transaction. The nonpublic information
at issue is not the insider’s to disclose; the issuer has paramount
96
rights and interests in regulating its disclosure. Accordingly, the
concept of materiality is critically important to the insider’s ex ante
transaction analysis.
But that is not all. Issuers and insiders must contend with
materiality case law that creates an unfavorable environment for
potential and actual defendants in the insider trading context. A key
Rule 10b-5 insider trading case that addressed issues of materiality is
97
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion
includes a frequently cited discussion of the appropriate legal
standard applicable to materiality determinations in insider trading
98
cases. While the materiality standard chosen by the Second Circuit
in Texas Gulf Sulphur was later supplanted by the existing standard
99
adopted by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and Basic, the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court makes a number of provocative observations about
materiality that expressly or implicitly survive TSC Industries and
100
Basic. Two are particularly relevant here.

95. See sources cited infra note 105 (discussing an insider’s limited ability to sell
securities in this context).
96. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 194 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing
situations in which an issuer has an interest in keeping nonpublic information
private or in regulating its disclosure); Condus v. Howard Sav. Bank, 781 F. Supp.
1052, 1057 (D.N.J. 1992) (describing information as one of a corporation’s most
valuable assets); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate
Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1161 (1996) (noting the
need for directors to manage information assets for the benefit of stockholders
where stockholders are engaging in decision making); A.C. Pritchard, United States
v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 13, 28-29 (1998) (highlighting the duty of the insider to protect the
confidentiality of the issuer’s information).
97. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
98. See id. at 849-50 (stating that a fact is material if it reasonably might affect the
value of the issuer’s securities and asserting that whether facts are material within
Rule 10b-5 depends upon a “balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event”).
99. Specifically, TSC Industries and Basic reject the notion that a fact is material if
it reasonably and objectively might affect the value of the issuer’s securities because
that formulation sets the standard for materiality too low and may subject the
corporation and its managers to liability for insignificant omissions. Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976). Rather, the current legal standard for materiality under Rule 10b-5 relies on
whether it is substantially likely that the fact would be important to a reasonable
investor. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (adopting the TSC Industries standard for
materiality).
100. For example, the probability versus magnitude test adopted in the Basic case
is directly attributed to the Texas Gulf Sulphur court. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 238-39
(citing to the Texas Gulf Sulphur and according deference to the endorsement of the
test by the SEC).
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One of the most interesting issues discussed in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case is whether the fact of an insider’s trade can be used as
evidence of the materiality of the nonpublic information possessed by
101
that insider.
A number of courts allow the fact of a trade by an
insider to be used as evidence of materiality in Rule 10b-5 actions
102
103
In the
against issuers, including the Supreme Court in Basic.
classical insider trading setting, this practice obviates the requirement
that materiality be proven separate and apart from the fact of a
104
trade.
Moreover, this judicial practice makes it impossible for a
transaction planner to give advice on materiality, except to say: “just
105
don’t trade.” If this advice were the intended effect of U.S. insider
trading regulation, one would think the law would be expressly stated
in these terms.
A second important aspect of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case that bears
on materiality analysis in insider trading cases is Texas Gulf Sulphur’s
invocation of a so-called “market effect” test as a means of
106
determining materiality. Under this test, a determination as to the
materiality of information is made based on whether that information
is “reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price
107
of the security.”
The “market effect” test was not endorsed by the
101. 401 F.2d at 851.
102. See, e.g., Abromson v. Am. Pac. Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 903 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997)
(qualifying the presence of insider sales as, at most, probative of materiality); Halye v.
The Lamson & Sessions Co., 752 F. Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (citing Basic
and noting insider trading during the relevant class period); Royce de R. Barondes,
Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REV. 883, 92122 (2000) (explaining that trading by insiders can be probative of materiality since it
may be a manifestation of an insider’s assessment of nonpublic information).
103. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n.18 (recognizing that trading by insiders may be
one indication of materiality).
104. Although this practice typically is observed by courts adjudicating corporate
disclosure claims, it may indicate a predisposition to finding materiality in cases
raising insider trading claims (especially when those claims accompany claims of
corporate nondisclosure or misstatements).
105. See Kitch, supra note 61, at 876 (arguing that there will never be a time when
an insider is not in possession of information that a reasonable investor would
consider important, thereby in effect prohibiting such key personnel from ever
trading). Moreover, in light of insider trading allegations in connection with recent
public reports of corporate fraud, some have suggested that corporate management
should be prohibited from selling stock altogether. See Pearl Meyer, Should Directors
Ever Sell? Director Accountability; Should Law Forbid Corporate Directors From Selling
Company Stock?; Panel Discussion, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2002, at 15, LEXIS,
News & Business Library, News Group File (discussing the benefits and dangers of
prohibiting directors from selling their shares during their board terms).
106. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(remarking that a company drilling activity was too remote in time and place to have
had any significant market impact).
107. See id. at 848 (quoting Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289
(1965)). Versions of this test are widely used in insider trading regulation outside the
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Supreme Court in the Basic case, and it has not been endorsed by the
108
Accordingly, it is difficult to
Supreme Court since that time.
predict with certainty how much of this test may survive scrutiny in a
109
decision made at that high a level of judicial review. However, the
“market effect” test continues to be used to some extent by lower
110
courts, at least as a component in their materiality analyses.
United States. See, e.g., Financial Services Reform Act, 2001, pt. 1 § 1042A (Austl.)
(covering “information [that is] not generally available,” where “if the information
were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material
effect on the price or value” of securities); Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-32,
§ 100.4(1) (1970) (Can.) (covering “confidential information . . . that, if generally
known, might reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of the
securities”); Companies Act, pt. V, § 108(2)(a) (1990) (Ir.) (covering “information
that . . . is not generally available, but, if it were, would be likely materially to affect
the price of . . . securities”); Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, pt. V, § 52 (1993)
(Eng.) (covering “securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the
information”).
108. In fact, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has refused to endorse the idea that
different standards of materiality should apply when insider trading is involved.”
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect
Paradigm of Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, at 1244 n.131 (1987); see
sources cited supra note 18.
109. What we do know is well summarized by Professor Gabaldon in an article
released close in time to the release of the Basic decision:
The main problem with the ‘market effect’ test inheres in the argument that
lack of market effect does not necessarily establish lack of importance. The
test, therefore, is not necessarily compatible with the Supreme Court’s
primary test of materiality. Even though lack of effect on price may not be
definitive proof of lack of importance, however, it is safe to say that if a fact,
when disclosed, would be substantially likely to affect market price, its
significance to reasonable investors (and thus its materiality) is conclusively
demonstrated. In other words, facts that satisfy the “market effect” test are a
subset of all material facts. Accordingly, the “market effect” test may be
regarded as a useful tool for proving, if not for disproving, materiality.
Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 1244-45 (footnote omitted).
110. See, e.g., No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am.
W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 n.13 and accompanying text (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting the market effect of disclosure in its materiality analysis); Oran v. Stafford,
226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing and emphasizing the role of the market
effect on the stock price by the company’s disclosure in materiality analysis); In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1987) (declaring
that “[b]ecause the market for BCF stock was ‘efficient’ and because the July 29
disclosure had no effect on BCF's price, it follows that the information disclosed on
September 20 was immaterial as a matter of law.”); Geiger v. Solomon-Page Group,
Ltd., 933 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Evidence of stock price movement
may be relevant to the issue of materiality but it is not determinative.”); Simon v. Am.
Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.R.I. 1996) (viewing a negative
reaction by the stock price as indicative of materiality). One attorney noted in his
argument at the District Court level :
I don’t want to beat a dead horse, but I believe Bloomberg, Dow Jones and
the Wall Street Journal constitute a good surrogate for reasonable investors.
They all picked this up as headline news and the market reacted. So, I don’t
believe that we can find that this matter is dismissible on materiality grounds
on a motion to dismiss.
Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank A.G., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,969 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2000). The SEC has argued for use of the “market reaction” test in the years since
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Indeed, the test may most frequently be used in insider trading
111
where hindsight may be 20/20 vision but ex ante
cases,
determinations may be uncomfortable at best. The possible use of
the “market effect” test in the ex ante analysis and ex post evaluation of
112
materiality is problematic for issuers and insiders, as well as judges.
Precision and clarity on materiality are extremely important to
disclosure regulation inquiries, especially those under Rule 10b-5 and
113
other antifraud rules. However, dependence on materiality analysis
is nowhere more significant than in the insider trading context.
Regardless of whether an insider’s trade or a market reaction is or
will be evidence of the materiality of any nonpublic information then
in the insider’s possession, materiality is a crucial issue—perhaps the
114
only issue—in a case where a trade by that insider can be proven.
The critical nature of materiality in insider trading analysis is strong
incentive to proceed toward greater precision and clarity in defining
115
what is “material” in the insider trading context.
the Basic case was decided. See Hoover, 903 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (describing the SEC’s
argument that a market reaction to subsequent disclosures reflects materiality).
111. Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 1244 n.131.
112. Ex ante determinations are “based on assumption and prediction.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 582 (7th ed. 1999). On the other hand, ex post determinations are
“retrospective” and “based on knowledge and fact.” Id. at 601.
113. See id. at 1240 (providing an overview of the concept of materiality as limiting
the reach of certain disclosure obligations under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act); see
also sources cited supra note 61.
114. See sources cited supra note 61 (including citations regarding the importance
of materiality in insider trading cases). Further complicating the matter is the fact
that, because historic information about the issuer likely has been or will be disclosed
in periodic reports, nonpublic information in the insider trading setting is likely to
be speculative (uncertainty about a possible future event), forward-looking, or soft
(opinions, estimates, projections) information, not historic or otherwise definitive
data or information. Although the Basic Court specifically limited its ruling to the
merger negotiation context, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 n.9 (1988)
(declining to address any other kinds of contingent or speculative information),
many lower federal courts use the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test to
determine the materiality of speculative information, even in factual circumstances
not involving premerger discussions or negotiations. See, e.g., In re Rockefeller Ctr.
Prop., Inc., 184 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing to Basic for the proposition that
“[m]ateriality of contingent or speculative information or events depends on ‘a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.’”);
SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing to Basic for the same
proposition); Gay v. Axline, No. 93-1491, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8989, at *17 (1st Cir.
Apr. 26, 1994) (stating that “[w]e further have recognized that if an alleged omission
involves ‘speculative judgments about future events,’ . . . materiality will depend
upon ‘a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity’”);
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
generally that “[m]ateriality depends not only on the magnitude of an effect but also
on its probability.”).
115. See Fried, supra note 75, at 340 (contending that, with a lower materiality
standard, “there would be less trading on inside information”).
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D. Inconclusive Answers
The foregoing description of materiality in the insider trading
context would not be complete without an analysis of the materiality
of the nonpublic information possessed by the insiders in our two
examples. Yet, in spite of relatively simple facts, application of the
TSC Industries materiality standard to the two examples set forth in
Section A of this Part proves to be a somewhat difficult assignment.
Results obtained from that application of law to facts are not certain
enough to make transaction planners, litigants, enforcement
agencies, and courts comfortable about materiality determinations;
whether made ex ante or ex post.
1.

Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting
In Example #1, a corporate officer, the CFO, sells the Corporation
stock at a time when she may have been in possession of nonpublic
information about the Corporation’s financial statement
misrepresentation. The application of the TSC Industries materiality
standard to the Corporation’s misrepresentations regarding the
adequacy of its reserves (and the corresponding overstatement of its
assets) described in Example #1 raises some interesting questions. Is
it substantially likely that a reasonable investor would find it
important to know about a misstatement of reserves that results in a
two percent overstatement of total assets in making an investment
decision about the Corporation’s securities? Is it substantially likely
that a reasonable investor would view information relating to the
Corporation’s misstatement of reserves that results in a two percent
overstatement of total assets as significantly altering the “total mix” of
information available? On the one hand, the “reasonable investor” in
an immediate post-Enron market is likely to be quite sensitive to asset
116
overstatements accompanied by executive stock trades.
On the
116. The facts regarding Enron’s reported corporate fraud involve, among other
things, an understatement of liabilities associated with off-balance sheet accounting.
See Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance:
MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 718 (2002)
(positing that “[a]t the risk of oversimplifying a complex set of circumstances, Enron
used certain foreign partnerships to take liabilities off of its balance sheet.”); David
Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should
Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 895 (2002); Lisa H. Nicholson, A
Hobson’s Choice For Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment: Striking a Balance
Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91,
96 n.18 (2002). Moreover, allegations of insider trading by former Enron executives
and others have accompanied the public reports of Enron’s corporate fraud. See
Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues,
58 BUS. LAW. 143, 171 (2002) (indicating, generally, the possibility of insider trading
violations by Enron executives among others); Peter Elkind & Bethany McLean, The
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other hand, the Corporation in Example #1 is no Enron. The
financial impact of the Corporation’s misrepresentations is
quantitatively relatively small, as a percentage of the Corporation’s
total assets, and was rapidly corrected in connection with the
Corporation’s preparation and filing of its next periodic report
under the 1934 Act. Moreover, the Corporation had outlined in its
117
public filings certain generalized financial risks of investment. The
Corporation’s misrepresentation of its reserves, and the related asset
overstatement was caused by the misapplication of accounting rules,
not (apparently) by an aggressive, strategic, goal-oriented use of
accounting rules. So, perhaps the misstatement is immaterial . . .
But . . . perhaps not. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
instructs against exclusive reliance upon quantitative measures in
118
determining materiality; but does it not seem rational that there is
some level of financial impact that is so de minimis as to be
immaterial—or at least presumptively immaterial? Is there not some
threshold level of financial impact at which we are comfortable
presuming or declaring nonpublic facts to be material? Absent
decisional law that is determinative (or at least highly instructive) as
119
to the answers to these questions, one cannot say that any particular
threshold has any particular significance. To what extent (if at all),
then, can a transaction planner rely on a good faith judgment that
known, undisclosed facts are immaterial in weighing the risks of
120
proceeding with a desired securities transaction?
Although the
Feds Close In on Enron, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 36 (noting that investigators may be
interested in possible insider trading violations in connection with corporate fraud at
Enron); Reuters, Enron Probe Likely to Expand, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at 3 (reporting
that “[i]nvestigators were said to be burrowing into Enron's ill-fated broadband
venture, while still scrutinizing murky off-balance-sheet deals and insider trading
allegations.”).
117. Such warnings give rise to a possible argument that the Corporation’s public
filings “bespoke caution” to an extent that the misstatements are not material. See
generally Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing the
“bespeaks caution” doctrine); In re Trump Castle Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d
Cir. 1993) (same).
118. See Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64
Fed. Reg. 45,150-01 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (expressing the
view that financial misstatements are not immaterial simply because they fall beneath
a numerical threshold).
119. Decisional law in this area tends to focus on both the misrepresentation of
financial fact and the circumstances surrounding the financial misstatement. See
Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the role
of numerical benchmarks in determining materiality); Blatt v. Muse Techs., Inc.,
Nos. Civ. A. 01-11010-DPW, Civ. A. 01-12173-DPW, 2002 WL 31107537, *8 (D. Mass.
Aug. 27, 2002) (indicating that context may be relevant to determining materiality of
financial misstatements, and citing, inter alia, Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d
539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997), on which certain of the facts in Example #1 are based).
120. In a subsequent proceeding questioning the legality of a trading transaction
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facts of Example #1 are relatively simple, the analysis is not as simple
121
as one might believe it should be, and the conclusion is uncertain.
2.

Example #2—Failed merger discussions
In Example #2, directors of the Target buy the Target’s shares
while they are in possession of nonpublic information about previous
offers and premerger discussions regarding the possible sale of
Target to Acquiror. Example #2 is a more complex example to
analyze than Example #1. The facts apparently do not allow for the
use of a compelling quantitative analysis or other simple application
of the relevant legal principles. In assessing materiality, one first
faces the task of determining the appropriate formulation of the
materiality standard to apply to these facts. The facts of Example #2
indicate that the directors bought the Target’s securities in March or
April after the Board had last rejected Acquiror’s offer for Target in
October. In March and April, were those October merger discussions
with the Acquiror still speculative information about a potential
merger (in which case the “probability versus magnitude”
formulation from Basic would apply) or has enough time passed by
March or April that the fact of the October merger discussions is
historical information calling for the application of one of the two
made on the basis of that kind of good faith determination, scienter may be
questionable. See infra note 121. Apart from this effect, the good faith nature of the
determination, however, does not help the issuer or insider in the area of materiality,
since materiality analysis focuses on an objective test-the importance of the
undisclosed information to the reasonable investor. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (articulating the test for materiality). Under this
standard, which focuses on the reasonable investor (rather than the actual investor
in any specific cause of action), the good faith of an individual issuer or insider in
determining to trade while in possession of nonpublic information is likely to be
deemed irrelevant.
121. Among other things, Example #1 raises questions about the relationship
between materiality and scienter, the requisite state of mind of the alleged insider
trader. If the CFO actually knew about the Corporation’s asset overstatement (and
accompanying reserve understatement) prior to selling the shares, then the CFO
may be deemed to have had the requisite intent, at least to the extent needed to
survive a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “allegations of
unusual insider trading by a defendant with access to material non-public
information can support a strong inference of scienter”); Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 169
(positing that pleading requirements for scienter may be met by allegations and
factual evidence of unusual trading while in possession of significant nonpublic
information). All that is at issue, then, is the materiality of the known misstatements.
If, however, the CFO traded in reckless disregard of the existence of the
misstatements, her intent or state of mind in trading is less clear. See In re Initial
Public Offering Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 365 n.111 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing
the “reckless disregard” standard in insider trading cases). Among other things, the
CFO would not have been on notice to evaluate the materiality of the misstatements.
Under these circumstances, any materiality guidance only would be relevant to ex post
judicial determinations.
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alternative formulations of the TSC Industries standard? It is hard to
say. Of course, the two formulations of the TSC Industries standard
and the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test are intended to
provide the same result in materiality determinations based on the
same facts. The application and interpretation of the standards and
test may, however, yield different results, principally because each
focuses attention on different facts or different factual contexts.
Under the “probability versus magnitude” test, absent facts
unknown to us indicating that the Acquiror still is interested in
pursuing an acquisition of Target in March and April, a merger of
Acquiror and Target intuitively has a low probability of occurring,
even though a merger is of the highest magnitude to Target.
Information about the offers or discussions regarding a possible
merger of Acquiror and Target (given that the Target had rejected
the Acquiror’s last offer over five months earlier) may seem too
speculative to disclose and, therefore, not material.
If we apply the TSC Industries alternative formulations, our
questions become whether there is a substantial likelihood (a) that a
reasonable investor would find information about the earlier
premerger discussions important in deciding whether to sell Target’s
securities or (b) that a reasonable investor would view that
information about the earlier premerger discussions as significantly
altering the “total mix” of information about Target then available in
the market. Given (for example) that Acquiror’s overtures were at
significant premiums to then existing market prices for Target’s
common stock, one could (but need not) conclude that there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find
information regarding the earlier merger discussions with Acquiror
important. Acquiror’s valuation of Target may, for example, be a
truer indicator of firm value than the market capitalization of Target.
Moreover, one could (but need not) conclude that there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view
information about the earlier merger discussions as significantly
altering the “total mix” of information about Target available in the
market. Based on the market’s reaction to the information (once
disclosed), and assuming no other information or events then
122
impacting the Target’s market price for the securities, it seems clear
that the market did not know or had not absorbed all of the facts

122. See sources cited supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (describing the
“market effect” test as a means of assessing materiality).
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regarding Acquiror’s overtures. Still, the materiality determination is
inconclusive based on the TSC Industries standard.
3.

An important, albeit limited, analytical role for decisional law
Any attempt to definitively settle the materiality questions posed in
Example #1 and Example #2 would involve a thorough canvassing of
existing decisional law in an effort to find analogous (or otherwise
instructive) cases. Because cases are fact-specific, a conclusive
determination regarding materiality only can be made if one locates a
case completely on point with the fact scenario in the case being
analyzed. While occasionally (and luckily) a case on point can be
located, it is a relatively rare occurrence. Even an exhausting and
exhaustive search for decisional law may not yield a case or group of
123
Given the obvious inefficiencies of
cases affording a clear answer.
this process, there must be a better way . . .
E. Why Ambiguity Matters
The reader may now say: “Okay, okay. So, the existing legal
standard defining materiality for use in the insider trading context is
ambiguous; but why should I care? Why not just leave things the way
they are?” Perhaps the reader even realizes that there can be
advantages to ambiguity in legal standards. Truly, ambiguity in a
substantive statutory or regulatory provision can be a valuable tool if
used in an appropriate manner to advance an underlying policy
124
goal. For example, ambiguity allows for more facile development of
123. For instance, in the case of Example #2, decisional law research would lead us
principally to a few federal judicial opinions in post-Basic cases that were decided on
pretrial motions. In each case, the court found that information regarding the
existence of premerger discussions up to and including approximately two years
before a securities trading transaction affected by an insider was not immaterial as a
matter of law. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 871 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1989) (asserting
that merger discussions undertaken over a two-year period may be material); see also
Caruso v. Metex Corp., No. CV 89-0571, 1992 WL 237299, *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992)
(maintaining that information regarding buyout a proposal may be material two
years later); Salit v. The Stanley Works, 802 F. Supp. 728, 732 (D. Conn. 1992)
(indicating that meetings regarding a possible merger that occur less than two years
before release of a subject proxy statement may be material in an action under Rule
14a-9 under the 1934 Act); Ross v. A.H. Robins, 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that “[n]o general
rule of time can be applied to all circumstances;” therefore, information in a fouryear-old annual report may still be material and subject to a duty to correct). These
opinions do not give us our answer, although they put us on notice that information
regarding the earlier premerger discussions between Acquiror and Target may be
material.
124. But see Fedders, supra note 13, at 87 (arguing, with respect to the federal
securities laws, that “the Commission must avail every opportunity to specify what
conduct is illegal [and] . . . should be unwilling to establish new rules through
enforcement action, and should always expose its new theories through
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and adjustments in legal rules among the three branches of
government and maintenance of a “political equilibrium between the
125
judicial and legislative branches.” Moreover, ambiguity can have a
deterrent value in that it may force potential violators to assess their
126
behavior on a conservative basis in order to avoid liability.
Encouraging that kind of conservatism could be one desirable effect
of the ambiguity in the meaning of the term “material” in the context
of the “disclose or abstain” rule, if it advances an applicable statutory
or regulatory objective.
However, in order to assess the effect of ambiguity on a statutory or
regulatory regime, one must assess the ambiguity in its overall context
and, in judging its relative merit as a legal device, balance any positive
127
impact of the ambiguity against its undesirable effects.
For
example, issuers and insiders may decide to take risks in their
securities trading transactions because the lack of clarity and
precision in insider trading law, including the concept of materiality,
128
lessens the risk of being caught and found liable.
There may be
rulemaking”). A search for the meaning of ambiguity in a legal test necessarily
invokes the debate of whether, and for what reasons, an ex ante-focused rule may be
preferable to an ex post-oriented standard. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) (articulating along these lines,
the differences between rules and standards). There are notable cost/benefit
tradeoffs with either. See id. at 562-63 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content, whereas
standards are more costly for legal advisors to predict or enforcement authorities to
apply because they require later determinations of the law’s content.”). Although
this article does not make a net social efficiency argument for better ex ante
materiality guidance, the need for that guidance also may be supportable on that
basis. Id.
125. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
627, 636 (2002).
126. See sources cited supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that
transaction planners may be incentivized to advise insiders not to trade at all); see also
Lisa J. Finnell, United States v. Carpenter:
Second Circuit Overextends the
Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 605,
612 n.34 (1987) (“market participants may act conservatively in trading on nonpublic
information for fear that their conduct may inadvertently fall under the prohibitions
against insider trading.”); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global
Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 856 (1992)
(“[T]ransactions that may in fact be legal will be avoided by the risk averse because
of the chilling effect that results from ambiguous standards . . . .”). But see Fried,
supra note 75, at 331 (reasoning that although “Rule 10b-5 prohibits trading on
inside information only when the information meets the strict legal standard of
materiality . . ., even in these cases, Rule 10b-5 cannot always deter insiders from
trading on such information.”).
127. See generally Finnel, supra note 126 (discussing an advantage and disadvantage
of ambiguity in insider trading law).
128. See id. (asserting that “market participants with access to inside information
and who are planning to use such information to their advantage may consider that
the ambiguity of the law reduces their likelihood of being caught”); see also Nnona,
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other hidden or ignored costs associated with the statutory or
regulatory ambiguity that more than offset the perceived benefits of
129
the ambiguity. These offsetting costs may neutralize any perceived
positive relationship between the ambiguity and underlying statutory
or regulatory policy and, in extreme cases, may cause the ambiguity
130
to do violence to underlying policy.
Accordingly, to assess the overall impact of ambiguity in the
interpretation and application of the existing materiality standard in
the context of insider trading, it is important first to understand the
net effect of this ambiguity on the key policies underlying U.S. insider
trading regulation. Parts III and IV principally are dedicated to this
task.
III. KEY LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES
A. Policies Underlying the Application of Rule 10b-5
to Insider Trading Cases
Existing ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the
current materiality standard are not necessary to a fair and honest
operation of U.S. securities trading markets, free from any breach of

supra note 78, at 221-23 (describing the difficulty faced by the SEC in defining and
detecting violations of insider trading laws); Salbu, supra note 126, at 856-57
(indicating that “transactions that may be illegal will be entered into by those who
are relatively risk prone under unclear guidelines . . . ”); see also sources cited infra
note 134.
129. See Nnona, supra note 78, at 223-25 (examining the costs associated with
enforcing the insider trading prohibition); see also Salbu, supra note 126, at 856-57
(noting that another cost of the ambiguities in U.S. insider trading regulation is the
deterrence of legal trading activity). Undue risk of criminal enforcement also may
be a cost associated with ambiguities in current U.S. insider trading regulation.
Professor Hicks notes:
[T]he United States considers insider trading a threat to fair and efficient
securities markets . . . . At present, neither the federal statutes nor the
Commission’s rules define this crucial term and U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that have addressed the issue do not resolve ambiguities about
either the scope or the underlying theory of this variety of fraud. The
uncertain parameters of insider trading under U.S. law are more than an
inconvenience. In addition to creating the risk of civil liability, a violation of
statutory provisions or SEC rules that prohibit insider trading can result in a
criminal conviction.
J. William Hicks, Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND. L.J. 791,
801-02 (1993).
130. See Nnona, supra note 78, at 224 (arguing that the inability of the SEC to keep
up with all of its duties compromises the purpose of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act);
Salbu, supra note 126, at 858 (noting that ambiguities in U.S. insider trading
regulation result in an overall reduction in the volume of market trading transactions
and asserting that “[u]nnecessary impediments to the voluntary and lawful
functioning of securities markets are inefficient and insupportable.”)
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trust by issuers and their insiders. It is a fundamental principle of
U.S. insider trading regulation that issuers and their insiders not be
permitted to benefit personally from any information advantage they
132
may have over other traders in the secondary markets.
Better
guidance on materiality, if well crafted, should not detract from
133
Rather, such guidance
adherence to this policy and principle.
should allow easier identification of the nature of information that, if
possessed at the time of a purchase or sale of securities, creates an
improper benefit and, as a result, should lead to more certainty and
134
success in civil and criminal enforcement.
131. See Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
273, 278 (2001) (comments of Harvey Goldschmid noting that the insider trading’s
capacity to undermine “investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our
markets” is a policy underlying insider trading regulation); Roberta S. Karmel,
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 Cardozo
L. Rev. 83, 103 (1998) (“The SEC's insider trading policy is best understood as an
effort to achieve fair pricing in the public securities markets in furtherance of the
general goals of the statute.”). A key element of this policy is the “investor
confidence” rationale for federal insider trading regulation. See Joel Seligman, The
Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1115 (1985) (asserting that investors must be confident that they can trade
securities without being victims of informational disadvantages); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1325-28 (1999) (acknowledging this policy
rationale in current U.S. insider trading regulation, but contending that “the
connection between insider trading regulation and the necessary baseline of investor
confidence is at best speculative”); Nnona, supra note 78, at 208 (stating that “[t]he
contention here is that insider trading harms the market by eroding public
confidence” and that “[a]t its root, this contention is related to notions of fairness”);
Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407 (2002) (discussing
investor confidence in the context of investor behavior); see also sources cited infra
note 149 (regarding the relationship among insider trading regulation, stockholder
value, and investor confidence).
132. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961) (explaining that
an important purpose of the 1934 Act was to eliminate the idea that corporate
officials use inside information for personal gain); Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in
the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 614-15 (1987) (commenting that “the evil
of insider trading is the trader’s misuse of business information for personal gain,
which justifies taking away the trader’s profits.”).
133. See Salbu, supra note 126, at 855-59 (making this argument with respect to
ambiguities in insider trading regulation generally).
134. One scholar notes:
Only the government has been reluctant to value lucidity and
predictability; in its opposition to legislatively-defined insider trading, it
valued enforcement flexibility above all else. Clarity and certainty have
special force in criminal prosecutions, but also retain great importance in
the civil area. If guided by these concepts, insider trading law would likely
yield either new statutory or administrative definitions or, at the very least,
bright-line liability criteria in case precedent.
Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates the
Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1206 (1997); see Fried, supra
note 75, at 310 (“Rule 10b-5 cannot easily deter insiders from trading on material
inside information in the many cases where there is little likelihood that a violator
will be detected and punished.”); Salbu, supra note 126, at 857-58 (stating and
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B. Policies Underlying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
From a more general policy perspective, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 were designed to protect investors and promote the integrity of
our securities markets by preventing fraud, manipulation, and
135
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
While the inherent ambiguities in the current legal standard
governing materiality may allow courts more latitude to find, or
otherwise fashion relief for, fraud, manipulation, or deception based
on notions of equity not inconsistent with existing legal precedent
(which power undoubtedly serves as a deterrent), these ambiguities
are not necessary to the protection of investors and the promotion of
integrity in our securities markets.
In fact, these ambiguities may negatively impact investor protection
and market integrity because of their effect on the decisions of
governmental bodies and private parties as to whether (and if so,
how) to pursue conduct that the investing public believes should or
136
does constitute illegal insider trading.
In an environment with
limited resources, a prospective plaintiff, enforcement agency, or
prosecutor logically would be more likely to invest those limited
resources on a clear-cut case than a case that promises complex and
137
difficult issues of proof.
If public and private enforcement of the
critiquing the argument that greater specificity leads to less enforcement).
Difficulties encountered in enforcing current law in the area of insider trading and
other corporate fraud have been noted in the press. See, e.g., Andrew Countryman,
Window of Opportunity; Talk About Good Timing: Execs Sell Before the Fall, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 2, 2003 (noting various enforcement difficulties with respect to purchases and
sales of securities by insiders); France & Carney, supra note 9, at 35 (suggesting that
the uncertainties (among other things) that prosecutors face in pursuing corporate
fraud cases may limit the number of convictions).
135. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997) (examining the
congressional purpose behind Section 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 473 n.13 (1977) (noting the legislative history of Section 10(b) regarding intent
to cover manipulation and deception); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
201-03 (1976) (citing to legislative history to show that Section 10(b) was enacted to
prevent the use of “manipulative” and “deceptive” devices, indicating the implicit
requirement of an element of scienter); Bryan S. Schultz, Casenote, Feigning Fidelity to
Section 10(b): Insider Trading Liability After United States v. O’Hagan, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1411, 1416-18 (1998) (summarizing the legislative history behind Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5); Seligman, supra note 131, at 1115 (examining the importance of
the integrity of the market as a policy underpinning for Section 10(b)); Thel, supra
note 17 (describing, in detail, the policy underpinnings of Section 10(b) in the
context of the 1934 Act).
136. See David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5
In Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781,
1792-93 (2000) (contending that ambiguity as to the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim
may have adverse consequences).
137. See Fried, supra note 75, at 333. This phenomenon may occur less frequently
in a plaintiffs’ bar-initiated class action in which the plaintiff’s counsel may assess
litigation risk based more on the probability, timing, and dollar value of a possible
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securities laws is to be an effective method of preventing and
punishing fraud, manipulation, and deception as a means of assuring
investors of the integrity of our securities markets, then U.S.
securities regulation should allow for more straightforward
identification and punishment of violators.
A less ambiguous materiality definition can be fashioned that
neither affords issuers and insiders a clear path around liability for
fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive conduct nor forces issuers and
138
insiders to disclose minutia.
Clearer, more precise, materiality
guidance would better support efficient and effective action against
alleged insider traders by more clearly defining conduct that
constitutes fraud, manipulation, or deceit, thereby enhancing
139
investor protection and market integrity.
C. Policy Support for Disclosure Under the 1934 Act Generally
The 1934 Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, taken as a
whole, are geared to the protection of investors and engenderment
of public confidence in the integrity of the securities markets,
primarily through the complete and accurate public disclosure of
140
important issuer and transaction information.
The 1934 Act
mandates both periodic and transaction-based public disclosures by
141
Moreover, in requiring the complete and
issuers and others.
settlement than the probability, timing, and dollar value of a favorable judgment. See
infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
138. That was a stated objective of the Court in Basic. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
139. Even in the class action area, a firm may be more willing to take on a case
where the materiality of the nonpublic information at issue in the case is clear. See
generally O’Hagan, supra note 134 (noting the enforcement issues arising from an
ambiguous body of insider trading law).
140. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977). One
commentator notes:
Disclosure serves the underlying purposes of the securities laws. The market
is protected against the prolonged effects of selective disclosure of material
information. Disclosure provides a sorely needed disincentive against insider
trading that is not dependent on SEC enforcement against identified
individuals. Market integrity is promoted. Finally, disclosure insures that
investors who have no special sources of information and are less adept at
following market signals have important information before them in an
understandable form. Any other rule would imply that investors who fail to
watch the Dow Jones tape do so at their own peril.
Barragar, supra note 76, at 103 (footnote omitted).
141. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by
issuers in periodic reports); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2003) (providing for required
disclosure by “persons acquiring more than five per centum of certain classes of
securities”); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by issuers
and others in proxy and information statements in connection with meetings of
stockholders); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by
issuers and others in connection with tender offers); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003)
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accurate disclosure of material facts in specific contexts, anti-fraud
142
The regulation of insider
rules act as gap-filling disclosure rules.
trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through the “disclose or
143
abstain” rule is but one example of many.
Yet, the ambiguities encountered by transaction planners in
interpreting and applying the existing legal standard for materiality
frequently discourage, rather than encourage, public disclosure of
144
important issuer and transaction information. An issuer or insider
may forego securities trading (and the attendant public disclosure
obligation) rather than trade and assume the risk of a lawsuit that
second-guesses, ex post, the issuer’s or insider’s ex ante materiality
145
analysis.
While this may be appropriate (and ultimately
unavoidable) under certain circumstances, those circumstances
should be limited. More specific materiality guidance can provide
appropriate limits and should result in a higher quantity and quality

(providing for required disclosure of beneficial ownership of securities by directors,
officers, and principal stockholders); see also infra note 209.
142. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory
Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 291-92 (discussing how mandatory
disclosure sets “a minimum disclosure floor” and “ensures that silence is not always
an option for issuers when evading the antifraud provisions”). But see Gregory S.
Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public Company Disclosure and
the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2255 (2000)
(arguing against the use of antifraud rules in this manner).
143. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2003) (governing misstatements and omissions in
1933 Act registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2003) (governing
misstatements and omissions in prospectuses and other communications under the
1933 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2003) (governing fraud in the offer or sale of
securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2003) (governing misstatements and omissions in
proxy statements); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003) (governing fraud in connection with
tender offers).
144. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 353, 355 (1988) (noting, with respect to insider trading law generally, that
“[f]ew believe that a rule requiring the possessor of inside information to disclose or
abstain from trading results in more disclosure than abstention.”); Dennis S. Karjala,
Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities
Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1473, 1517 (1986). In a recently released study, the Securities
Industry Association (“SIA”) reports that Regulation FD (a two-year-old disclosure
regulation that, like Rule 10b-5, uses materiality as a disclosure filter) has resulted in
the public disclosure of less information by the public companies to which it applies
than had been made before adoption of Regulation FD. See Reg. FD Report, supra note
83, at 12. Other studies and surveys also indicate that, to some degree, Regulation
FD has had this effect. See id. The same SIA study finds that there also has been an
adverse effect on the quality of publicly disclosed information. See id. at 12-13.
There is also some corroboration of this finding in other surveys. See id.
Accordingly, it may not be true that “the flexibility of the materiality standard
provides an efficient balance between the investors’ informational needs and the
benefits provided by allowing managers to trade.” O’Connor, supra note 75, at 363.
145. See infra Part IV.B.
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of disclosure in circumstances in which disclosure is required to be
146
made.
IV. IMPACTS ON STOCKHOLDER VALUE
Neither policies underlying insider trading regulation, Section
10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the 1934 Act as a whole, nor the federal
securities laws and regulations provide a guarantee of value
147
preservation or value enhancement to investors. Yet, the effects of
148
do affect public
law and regulation on stockholder value
perceptions about the effectiveness of investor protection and public
146. See Saul Levmore, Licensing: Permission Slips in Corporate and Fourth Amendment
Law, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 709, 714 n.14 (1999) (noting in another context the
argument that “disclosure would be more likely if courts would articulate the ‘real’
rule applicable”). The validity of this contention depends upon at least three things:
(1) the ability of the rule maker (Congress, the SEC, or the courts) to clearly and
comprehensively articulate more specific materiality guidance; (2) the benefits of
disclosure under that enhanced guidance outweighing the detriments (such that
issuers and insiders are encouraged to disclose, rather than abstain from trading);
and (3) actual compliance by issuers and insiders with the enhanced guidance.
Assessment of these factors is, to some extent, dependent on a more detailed analysis
of the incentives provided by specific and generalized disclosure obligations. See
Bernard S. Black, Legal Theory: Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 546 n.9 (1990) (noting that “the debate over whether
disclosure rules should be mandatory would benefit from analysis of when SEC
disclosure rules simply mandate disclosure that companies would provide anyway,
when they require more than private actors would provide, and when securities law
liability discourages disclosure that would otherwise be made.”).
147. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 62 F.R.D. 181, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(“[H]owever broadly the terms of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be construed, the Act
and the Rule do not protect all who may have sustained a loss as a result of deceptive
practices.”).
148. The concept of stockholder value is not widely recognized in the law and can
mean different things to different people in different contexts. See Panel Discussion,
Reform: Are There Too Many Cooks in the Corporate Kitchen?, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX
L. F. 67, 89 (1997) (including definitions of stockholder value in response to a
question regarding the same from moderator Jill Fisch); see also Janis Sarra,
Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Governance
Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, 33 OTTAWA L. REV.
177, 210 (2001-02) (discussing the differing views of stockholder value in Europe and
the United States); Symposium, Corporate Citizenship: A Conversation Among the Law,
Business and Academia, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 726, 747 (2001) (referencing the
comments of Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell on stockholder value). For purposes of
this article, stockholder value is defined simply as a net dollar-value enhancement in
a stockholder’s equity holdings of an issuer, measured most easily (but not
exclusively, or even accurately) by reference to the price of the issuer’s stock in the
public securities markets. Increases should reflect the proportional sharing of net
corporate benefits (dollar-value enhancements) and decreases represent the
proportional sharing of net corporate detriments. In so defining stockholder value,
this article does not argue the merits of a market value-driven method, or any
particular method, for valuing the firm or measuring stockholder value. These
matters are part of a broader scholarly debate beyond the scope of this Article.
Michael R. Schwenk, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
649, 658-62 (1994); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation
Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457 (1996).
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confidence in the integrity of our securities markets. If insider
trading regulation has negative impacts on perceived or actual
stockholder value, investors are likely to feel either totally vulnerable
or under-protected and lose confidence in the integrity of those
149
markets.
Accordingly, it is important to identify perceived and
actual negative impacts of the current materiality standard on
stockholder value as additional support for the institution of
enhanced substantive clarity in U.S. insider trading regulation,
including by way of more specific materiality guidance.
A. Insider Trading and Stockholder Value
The overall effects of insider trading regulation on stockholder
value have been debated for decades, with no absolute truth
150
emerging.
Some scholars argue that unregulated insider trading
151
enhances stockholder value. These scholars generally articulate two
bases for their arguments: (i) unregulated insider trading tends to
increase the price efficiency of the market by more accurately

149. Although the relationship among insider trading regulation, stockholder
value, and investor confidence is unclear, these themes permeate various debates
regarding the desirability of insider trading and existing insider trading regulation.
See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 313, 321 (2002) (describing and noting Henry Manne’s work on the
relationship between insider trading regulation and stockholder value); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Transnational Business Law in the Twenty-First Century: The Globalization of
Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 95-96 (2002) (contending that
enforcement, rather than mere enactment, of insider trading prohibitions may
promote “deep and liquid markets”); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1468 (1986) (positing that
“the legal prohibition against insider trading prevents shareholders from reaching
compensation agreements with the managers of their firms that would make both
sides better off.”); Spencer Derek Klein, Note: Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making,
and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 673 (1988) (noting that
“investor confidence is not simply a function of the ability to enforce the securities
laws’ prohibition of insider trading” and that “the factors that impact upon investor
confidence are numerous and interrelated.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady,
Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319,
1325-26 (1999) (describing perceived relationships between insider trading
regulation and stockholder value); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10 n.2 (1984)
(noting that insider trading itself may undermine investor confidence); Alan
Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV.
375, 383 n.26 (1999) (“the economic arguments in favor of insider trading law that
rely on arguments about promoting investor confidence depend in part on an
assumption that investors are more likely to invest funds in markets that are felt
generally to be ethical or fair.”).
150. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
Richard W. Painter, Insider Trading and the Stock Market Thirty Years Later, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 305 (1999) (describing Henry Manne’s work and legacy in the economic
analysis of insider trading).
151. See Painter, supra note 150 and sources cited infra notes 152 & 153.
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152

reflecting all available information in the market price of securities
and (ii) unregulated insider trading efficiently compensates
corporate insiders for managing the firm in a manner that leads to a
153
higher firm value. Others argue that some form of insider trading
regulation is needed, at least for some issuers and their insiders, to
maximize stockholder value. These scholars state varying points of
view. Some acknowledge the value-enhancing attributes of insider
trading, but document costs that exceed these benefits while others
quarrel with the contention that all unregulated insider trading is
154
value-enhancing.
This Part does not propose to enter into the general debate about
the effects of insider trading regulation on stockholder value.
Rather, it assumes that insider trading regulation is here to stay and,
instead, focuses on ways in which existing U.S. insider trading
regulation—with its unclear, imprecise materiality standard—detracts
from stockholder value.
Specifically, this Part supports the
proposition that the lack of clarity and precision in that materiality
standard creates additional transaction costs that are not apparently
offset by any resulting benefit.
B. Foregone or Delayed Transactions
One impact on stockholder value is created by the issuer or an
insider determining to not engage in, or to delay the commencement
155
of, a value-enhancing transaction because of dual determinations
152. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983). But see Fried, supra note 75, at 315-16 (critiquing
this claim).
153. See James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1033 (1989)
(“[S]everal commentators assert that, if corporate managers were partially
compensated by being allowed to utilize the value of the nonpublic information that
they discover through their positions, the corporation and its shareholders would
benefit due to the generation of certain managerial incentives.”); Manne, supra note
150, at 30-31; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 152; Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE
EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (1974); Henry G. Manne,
Insider. Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1970).
154 See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110-12 (1998); see also Amir N. Licht,
International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 270-71 (1998).
155. Value-enhancing transactions by issuers are relatively easy to conceptualize in
this context. See Koenig, supra note 153, at 1046, 1076 (noting, with respect to
materiality in the insider trading context, that “[s]tandards that are not in the form
of a bright-line rule, like the probability/magnitude test, fail to provide managers
with the flexibility and freedom necessary to maximize shareholder value by entering
the arena for corporate control”). The stockholder value-enhancing nature of an
insider’s trading transaction may be harder to fathom. However, arguments can be
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that (1) the issuer or insider is, or may be, in possession of material
information not yet disclosed to the public and (2) the material
nonpublic information in the actual or possible possession of the
issuer or insider cannot, or (for strategic or other reasons) should
156
not, be disclosed.
Under these circumstances, the “disclose or
abstain” rule effectively means “abstain,” and the issuer or insider
must forgo the desired trading transaction until such time as the
information is either immaterial or publicly disclosed and
157
disseminated.
This is true regardless of the potential public or
158
personal benefits associated with the desired transaction.
The
issuer or insider cannot, then, engage in a trading transaction while
in possession of possibly—but not clearly—material information,
even if the transaction would tend to increase short-term or long159
term stockholder value.
Examples of issuer trading transactions
that might need to be foregone or delayed under these circumstances
made that the purchase of an issuer’s securities by a director or officer is valueenhancing. The principle argument in this regard is that the director’s or officer’s
ownership of the issuer’s securities brings his or her economic interests in line with
those of other issuer stockholders, thereby incentivizing the director or officer to
maintain or create market value in the issuer’s shares for the benefit of all
stockholders. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 134 (1996); Mark J.
Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8-10
(2000). The public sale of issuer stock by a director or officer also may be seen as
value-enhancing in that the emotional goodwill engendered by the additional
compensation represented by any financial gain realized in that sale, while not paid
to the insider by the issuer, may incentivize the director or officer to higher levels of
performance on behalf of stockholders on an ongoing basis, especially if combined
with additional, unrealized equity incentives. See David M. Schizer, Executives and
Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440,
444 (2000) (arguing that “new unvested grants are supposed to preserve the desired
incentive”) (footnote omitted). Alternatively, however, giving an executive complete
freedom to time his or her sale transaction may result in the executive profiting from
the sale at the expense of the issuer’s other stockholders. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 751, 759, 829-31 (2002).
156. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the
possible importance of secrecy in merger negotiations). One can imagine any
number of situations other than pre-merger discussions and negotiations in which an
issuer or insider may need or desire to remain silent. These instances might include,
for example, the existence of contractual confidentiality restrictions or possible
involvement as a plaintiff or defendant in significant threatened litigation.
157. See Bacastow, supra note 74, at 131-32 (noting that, in the context of insider
trading, “Rule 10b-5’s inherent inability to provide adequate notice leads to the
deterrence of legitimate trading activities”); O’Connor, supra note 75, at 366 (noting
the potential for deterrence of “legitimate activity”); Salbu, supra note 126, at 856
(“under unclear guidelines . . . transactions that may in fact be legal will be avoided
by the risk averse because of the chilling effect that results from ambiguous
standards”).
158. See Salbu, supra note 126.
159. See supra notes 155 & 157 (discussing value enhancing transactions and the
potential inhibitions that Rule 10b-5 places on trading activity).
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include open market stock repurchase programs, self-tender offers to
retire all or part of an outstanding class or series of economically
disadvantageous securities, and private and public offerings at
160
favorable prices.
Suppose, for example, that an issuer has announced a market
repurchase program with certain established price and timing
161
requirements.
Market repurchase programs generally enhance
stockholder value because they provide for the distribution of
corporate funds to stockholders, reduce the number of outstanding
shares of the issuer (enhancing per-share valuations for ongoing
stockholders), and typically cause the market price of the issuer’s
stock to rise (absent offsetting transactions, events, or public
162
disclosures), at least for the short term.
Moreover, market
repurchases may be a more efficient way to increase stockholder
value than, for example, the declaration and payment of dividends,
which would not implicate the insider trading “disclose or abstain”
163
rule, since no purchase or sale of securities is involved.
Market repurchase programs consist of purchases by an issuer of its
164
own securities in the open market.
Accordingly, under the
“disclose or abstain” rule, an issuer that desires to institute, or
continue operating in, a market repurchase program must ensure
that it is not in possession of material nonpublic information before
165
engaging in purchases under the program. Where (i) a corporate
160. Each of these transactions represents a purchase (open market stock
repurchase program or self-tender offer) or sale (private or public offering) of a
security by the issuer that is subject to the “disclose or abstain” rule, in addition to
any mandatory disclosure obligations prescribed by federal securities law or
regulation.
161. See generally F. H. Buckley, When the Medium is the Message: Corporate Buybacks
as Signals, 65 IND. L.J. 493, 493-96 (1990) (describing the nature and form of stock
repurchase transactions).
162. See id. at 496 (describing different explanations for stock price increases
associated with stock repurchases). See generally Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of
Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J. CORP. L. 425 (2002) (describing stockholder value
effects and other attributes of share repurchases).
163. See Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders,
3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-30 (1989); Song, supra note 162, at 498-99; see also Luca
Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the
European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2001).
164. See Enriques, supra note 163, at 1179 (discussing the market repurchase
process); Jesse M. Fried, Open Market Repurchases:
Signaling or Managerial
Opportunism?, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 865, 865 (2001) (describing an open market
repurchase as a transaction “in which a corporation buys back stock in the open
market, usually through a broker, over a period ranging from several months to
several years.”).
165. See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Share holders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1108 (1983) (“Federal securities laws
contemplate repurchases but require that the corporation adequately disclose the
relevant considerations to the sellers.”); Nagy, supra note 10, at 1178-79 (noting and
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issuer possesses nonpublic information, (ii) a materiality
determination cannot conclusively be made, and (iii) disclosure of
166
the nonpublic information is not an available option, the issuer
typically will not institute (or will suspend operation of) a market
repurchase program, despite its potential to increase stockholder
value. For instance, if Example #2 were related to the application of
the “disclose or abstain” rule in the context of an issuer stock
repurchase transaction (rather than director stock purchases), the
three enumerated facts in the preceding sentence may be deemed to
be present, and the issuer would suspend its market repurchases.
Clearer materiality guidelines would enable an issuer in these
circumstances to better ensure that the determination to forego or
suspend a market repurchase program is made out of legal necessity,
rather than legal uncertainty.
C. Materiality Assessment and Decision-Making as a Management
Distraction
Stockholder value is negatively impacted by management’s inability
167
to focus on the business and operations of the issuer. A director or
officer can focus on the business and operations of the issuer when
distractions are minimized (or, ideally, eliminated). Management
distractions may include time spent engaged in corporate or personal
decision-making relating to a possible transaction in the issuer’s
securities by the issuer or one of its officers or directors. Especially
168
(but not exclusively) if the issuer has a securities trading policy in
citing to cases in which the disclose or abstain rule has been applied to issuer stock
repurchases).
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (positing situations in which an
issuer may determine not to disclose information).
167. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 356 (1991) (mentioning
management
distractions in the context of shareholder initiatives as a cost).
168. The term “securities trading policy” is used in this article to refer to any
corporate compliance program that relates to securities trading matters. These
programs have their roots in the substance of U.S. insider trading regulation,
especially the control person liability provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2003), and the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in various sections of Chapter 2B of 15
U.S.C. (2003)), as well as in New York Stock Exchange guidance and the federal
sentencing guidelines. See generally Steven Chasin, Comment: Insider v. Issuer:
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV.
859, 861-64, 869-74 (2003) (describing insider trading compliance policies and the
bases for issuer liability for an insider’s trading transactions); Kevin B. Huff, Note,
The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A
Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252, 1267-72 (1996) (exploring certain
rationales for compliance programs); Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance
Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1994) (examining insider trading
compliance programs).
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place, the personal decision-making of an officer or director is
directly intertwined with the operations of the issuer, making it more
likely that the decision-making process will be a management
169
distraction.
In addition, regardless of the existence of a formal securities
trading policy, an issuer may (and should) choose to institute
securities trading blackout periods—periods of time during which
neither the issuer nor its insiders are permitted to trade in the
issuer’s securities because of the deemed or actual possession by the
issuer and its insiders of material nonpublic information—at
170
appropriate times.
Before issuing a “no-trading” directive to
commence such a blackout period, the issuer’s management typically
participates in determining the materiality of any nonpublic
171
information in the possession of the issuer and its insiders. During
the blackout period, management assesses and responds to requests
from insiders who have an emergent need or desire to trade.
Management determines when the blackout period ends.
Even in the absence of a formal securities trading policy or
corporate directive that expressly prohibits or restricts trading by the
issuer or insider in an issuer’s securities, the proposed securities
trader (whether it be the issuer or one of its directors or officers)
169. Many securities trading policies rely in part on the use of trading windows,
periods of time during which insiders are permitted to trade in the issuer’s securities
(absent the possession of material nonpublic information). See Fried, supra note 75,
at 345-49. There are many other different types and forms of securities trading
policy. See Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 168, at 1829-36. See generally Alan
Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corporate Compliance
Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 180 (1990).
170. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 155, at 830 (referencing the use of trading
windows and blackout periods as a means of preventing executive stock trading);
Chasin, supra note 168, at 863 (explaining the nature of a blackout period); Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1261 n.106 (2001).
171. See Chasin, supra note 168, at 868-69 (noting that “[m]ateriality presents a . . .
problematic determination for compliance officers” in the insider trading context).
Management makes similarly problematic materiality determinations in other
securities regulation contexts. See Pritchard, supra note 70, at 936 (noting that
corporate management and counsel make materiality determinations required by
disclosure regulation); Scott Russell, Note, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U.L. REV. 527, 539
(2002) (noting that under Regulation FD, “corporate managers must make
materiality determinations on-the-spot, without any guidance from the SEC
regarding what information would be considered material.”); Leonard B. Simon &
William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation:
The Erroneous Academic
Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
959, 983 n.93 (1996) (noting that management determines the materiality of a
lawsuit to an issuer in assessing whether to disclose it in an annual report); R.
Gregory Roussel, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery
Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1091 (1998) (noting that materiality determinations
typically come from corporate officers or other representatives).
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should, and logically would, assess the materiality of any nonpublic
information before engaging in securities trading. This assessment is
a key element in the decision-making about whether the issuer or its
insiders will, in fact, trade in the issuer’s securities. The complexity
and, in many cases, inconclusive results of the analyses that underlie
this assessment, whether or not prompted by a formal securities
trading policy or a corporate desire to identify and communicate the
existence of securities trading blackout periods, creates significant
distractions for any director or officer participating in the corporate
or personal decision-making and for in-house counsel participating
172
in that process (as applicable).
The analytical complexity of
materiality determinations and the inconclusive nature of the results
obtained are ordained in principal part by the ambiguity of the
existing materiality standard. While no empirical research located to
date directly demonstrates the magnitude of the costs associated with
the management distractions created by this complexity and
inconclusiveness, the distractions logically must detract from
stockholder value.
Having said this, however, these distractions should not be of
concern if the stockholder value benefits of the materiality
assessment process equal or exceed the costs associated with that
process. Under those circumstances (i.e., where stockholder value
benefits equal or exceed costs), the materiality assessment process
cannot be said to have a net negative effect on stockholder value. For
example, if the materiality assessment process were to effectively
insulate the issuer and its insiders from prolonged involvement in an
expensive legal action based on that materiality assessment, we might
find that the stockholder value benefits of engaging in the assessment
172.
In the case of a desired trade by a director or officer of the issuer, while the
formalized decision-making process may not be directly connected with the issuer, a
director or officer still would be likely to involve the issuer’s counsel and to handle
transactional questions and decision-making during business hours; potentially
decreasing the amount or effectiveness of time spent by all on the issuer’s business.
See Terry Fleming, Perspectives on Business Law: Telling the Truth Slant—Defending
Insider Trading Claims Against Legal and Financial Professionals, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1421, 1438 (2002) (“An insider who consults with and relies on the advice of
legal counsel prior to engaging in a trade may use those circumstances to
demonstrate good faith and the lack of scienter.”); Patrick D. Harvill, Note: The
Forgotten Warrior: Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Battle Against Insider
Trading, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 226, 238 (noting the Supreme Court’s view, expressed in
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner et al., 472 U.S. 299, 317 (1985), that
“insiders . . . are relatively sophisticated and have access to legal counsel”); Henry L.
“Scott” Nearing, III, Note: Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System: The Impact of Rule
10b-5’s Corporate Disclosure Requirements on the Williams Act’s Tender Offer and Best Price
Rules, 40 VILL. L. REV. 263, 299 (1995) (suggesting that “corporate management . . .
develop procedures assuring that corporate personnel, familiar with the current state
of public information, pre-approve all insider trades.”).
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process exceed the costs of engaging in that process. Where the
issuer or an insider decides to trade in the issuer’s securities after
making such an assessment, however, the vagueness of the existing
materiality standard and the uncertain results frequently obtained by
its application to specific facts may tend to encourage, rather than
discourage, the commencement of litigation (including expensive,
time-consuming, settlement-focused securities fraud class action
173
litigation) against the issuer or insider or both.
Better materiality
guidance logically should enable issuers and their insiders to make
decisions borne out of an increased level of certainty, decreasing the
174
risk that litigation is brought or sustained.
D. The Cost of Outside Counsel
Frequently, outside counsel is involved in the materiality
assessment process when the issuer or one of its insiders desires to
175
trade in the issuer’s securities.
This involvement may occur
regardless of firm or legal department size and may be most related
to the perceived visibility, importance, or degree of difficulty of the
176
materiality determination. Corporate transactional counsel tend to
face materiality determinations like those emanating from the facts of
Example #2 (which, as you may recall, invokes the possible materiality
of premerger negotiations) on a regular basis. The costs of retaining
177
outside counsel may be relatively high.
For issuers that both
173. The subject of securities fraud class action litigation is discussed in greater
detail infra Part V.
174. Moreover, civil or criminal enforcement of insider trading prohibitions
under Rule 10b-5 may be more likely where the materiality of any nonpublic
information is apparent.
175. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOKLYN L. REV. 763, 850 n.232 (1995) (regarding outside counsel’s potential role
in making materiality determinations); see also Jerry Duggan, Note, Regulation FD:
SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to “Chill Out”, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 159, 182 (2001)
(noting that law firms stand to benefit from the need for interpretation of
ambiguous language in Regulation FD). One securities regulation casebook notes
that: “[b]ecause the materiality concept is such a workhorse in securities regulation,
learning to apply it is probably the most valuable skill a securities lawyer can
acquire.” Cox et al., supra note 51, at 40. A recent survey of lawyers conducted by an
ABA task force confirms that legal advice is sought on the question of materiality in
the context of Regulation FD. Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 13.
176. Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 13; Harold A. Segall, Then and Now: The
Commercial Practice of Law for Over Fifty Years, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 570-71 (1997)
(noting that outside counsel often is retained for important or specialized matters).
177. Comparisons of the cost of in-house representation and representation by
outside counsel in litigation most often indicate that in-house representation is less
expensive. See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the
Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.
205, 241 n.118 (1997). But see Segall, supra note 176, at 569 (indicating that it may
cost less to retain outside counsel).
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employ in-house counsel and retain outside counsel for specialized
work on corporate transactions, materiality assessments and
determinations generally are made based on consultation between inhouse and outside counsel, resulting in some duplication of effort
178
(and, therefore, cost).
The ultimate stockholder value analysis concerning the use of
outside counsel is the same as that described above with respect to
management distractions: the ambiguity inherent in the existing
materiality standard results in the issuer incurring costs that are not
179
offset by related benefits.
In principle, issuer costs associated with
the retention of outside counsel in the materiality assessment process
are somewhat easier to quantify than the costs associated with
management distractions.
Moreover, these cost consist of
professional fees (typically determined by hourly billing at
predetermined rates) and disbursements (including, e.g., online
180
legal research, telephone, facsimile, and courier costs).
Hourly
billing rates for partners and associates in different markets
periodically are published in trade (and sometimes carried in
181
general) news media.
There are many missing links, however, in
precisely quantifying the costs associated with outside counsel
participation in materiality assessments regarding insider trading
transactions. These include (1) the number of assessments that are
made, (2) the seniority of the attorney(s) engaged in the process,
(3) the number of billable hours spent by each in that process, and
(4) the dollar amount of any disbursements associated with each
assessment. These costs factors vary and frequently are hidden in or
indistinguishable from those associated with overall considerations
made in connection with the structuring and implementation of a
proposed transaction. However, the complex, unguided, fact-based,
178. Of course, the active involvement of in-house counsel in any matter handled
by outside counsel may result in cost management benefits. See Segall, supra note
176, at 569 (discussing cost issues as part of the reasoning behind employing inhouse or outside counsel). Moreover, expert outside counsel may be able to provide
more efficient and cost-effective research on issues of materiality. These and other
factors may result in certain efficiencies, but do not negate the fact that the use of
outside counsel may generate costs beyond those generated by management
distractions. Id.
179. See discussion supra Part IV.C (describing the potential effects of managerial
distraction).
180. See generally Symposium, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of
Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy: Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2003)
(discussing various types of fee arrangements associated with legal practice).
181. See, e.g., A Firm-by-Firm Sampling of Billing Rates Nationwide, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9,
2002, at B12; Ruth Singleton, Firms Raised Hourly Rates in 2002, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20,
2003, at 19.
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individualized nature of materiality assessments under the current
legal standard makes it likely that outside counsel at both senior and
junior levels will spend many billable hours at the task. In addition to
research and consultation, outside counsel may generate fees by
preparing for and attending meetings of the issuer’s board of
directors to advise the issuer on materiality issues, especially where
the issuer’s trading is under inquiry. In exceedingly rare cases,
outside counsel may be asked to render to the issuer a written legal
182
opinion on a materiality question.
Regardless of the precise, actual costs involved in outside counsel’s
participation in the materiality assessment process, however, there
exist clear costs associated with the engagement of outside counsel as
183
participants in the materiality assessment process.
These costs are
not apparently offset by any actual or perceived stockholder value
benefits associated with that engagement (apart from a potential
intangible, institutional satisfaction that materiality determinations
are being made by the most qualified decision makers). Again, there
is no evidence, for example, that the involvement of outside counsel
in materiality determinations: (i) better insulates the issuer or its
insiders from legal action, including expensive, drawn out securities
fraud class action litigation; (ii) leads to lower settlement value in any
securities fraud litigation; or (iii) better ensures victory in such
litigation after completion of an exhaustive, time-consuming, and
costly trial and appeal process. In certain circumstances, the best that
outside counsel can do, as earlier indicated, is to advise the issuer to
forego or delay commencement of the transaction that causes the
duty to disclose.

182. Outside counsel typically would resist rendering such an opinion except in
the most obvious case (where the client typically would not request an opinion from
outside counsel). Even in an obvious case, however, counsel likely would have to
issue a reasoned or qualified opinion (e.g., “Based upon and subject to the foregoing
assumptions, limitations, qualifications, and exceptions, while the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, we are of the opinion that a court with proper jurisdiction
should find the facts . . . material”). See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The
Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 643 n.250 (1998) (“Opinions laden
with foundational assumptions are known as ‘reasoned opinions.’”). Any opinion
rendered in a non-obvious case undoubtedly would be a highly qualified opinion
with many carefully drawn, expressly stated assumptions, limitations, and exceptions.
183. This is a typically noted effect of the use of ex post legal standards. See Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 569 (1992).
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V. STOCKHOLDER VALUE IN THE CURRENT CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
ENVIRONMENT
The current securities fraud class action environment creates,
among other things, additional pressure on stockholder value,
especially in the insider trading context. The lack of clarity around
materiality contributes to this effect. Specifically, the current illdefined legal standard governing materiality determinations makes
pretrial dismissal of an insider trading class action difficult, regardless
184
of the overall merits of the action.
For similar reasons, a trial
defense based on immateriality is risky at best. These factors likely
contribute to the large number and percentage of settlements in
insider trading actions.
These settlements decrease corporate
resources available to stockholders (as residual claimants on the
issuer’s assets), without resulting in a proportional sharing among
185
stockholders of the settlement payment or other benefits.
This Part begins by briefly placing the current securities fraud class
action environment into its historical context. Additionally, it
provides some basic information about insider trading class actions.
Finally, this Part describes and discusses the resulting need for
substantive class action reform to address the materiality issue.
184. See Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law:
The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 71, 100 (“Under the definition of materiality adopted, it is difficult for a
defendant to negate the element as a matter of law on a motion for summary
judgment.”); Fleming, supra note 172, at 1430 (“Motions for judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment are rarely granted, and the decision on materiality
is ordinarily reserved for the fact-finder.”). Courts have noted that summary
judgment on the issue of materiality is not favored. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450
(quoting Johns Hopkins U. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)); Caravan
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 565 (9th
Cir. 1985); (“Summary judgment is normally inappropriate for determining the
materiality of undisclosed information.”). Yet, a number of cases involving issues of
materiality are decided on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else
Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb In Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 116
n.94 (2002) (noting, with respect to a group of review of securities fraud opinions,
that “[o]f the 91 (out of 100) cases that were decided at the motion to dismiss stage,
64 involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants (i.e., over 70
percent)”).
185. For one thing, plaintiffs’ bar attorneys in these class actions generally get
paid out of any settlement funds. See Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class
Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 482 (1997); Denise N. Martin et
al., Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 128-31 (1999) (describing class action fee arrangements
generally). For another, depending on the facts (including whether the alleged
injury occurred in connection with a purchase or sale when the action is brought,
and whether stockholder plaintiffs opt out of participation in the action) the issuer’s
then existing stockholders may or may not be injured parties or plaintiffs in the
action. See infra notes 203 & 204 and accompanying text.
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A. Historical Context of the Current Securities Fraud Class Action
Environment
The 1934 Act does not expressly provide for private rights of action
for violations of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Such a right, however,
186
long ago was held to be available. Since that time, private actions—
and, in particular, class actions—have become a popular way of
enforcing securities fraud claims, including insider trading
187
allegations.
By the mid-1990s, concerns about the number and
188
propriety of securities fraud class actions had been loudly voiced.
Accordingly, in 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities
189
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) as a means of, among
other things, reducing the number of (assertedly) specious securities
class actions brought against issuers and reducing the primary role of
190
plaintiffs’ bar counsel in initiating those class actions. Data suggest
that the PLSRA may have been largely ineffective at achieving these
191
objectives. More class action securities litigation was commenced in
186. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsom Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
187. The manner in which modern class action litigation developed made its
application to insider trading actions inevitable. See Susan T. Spence, Looking
Back . . . in a Collective Way, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2002, at 21 (outlining the history
of class action law).
188. See id. at 24; see also Wager & Ward, supra note 39, at 13; Charles H. Gray,
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Auctions as an
Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 829, 830-31, 833
(2002).
189. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.
from §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (2000)).
190. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Act, Hearing on S.1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, House & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 4-5 (1998) (testimony of
John F. Olson, Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher) (“The PSLRA was intended to stem the
tide of frivolous nationwide class action lawsuits.”); Eugene P. Caiola, Comment,
Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act
of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 316 (2000); Roslyn Falk, May a Shareholder Who Objects to a
Proposed Settlement of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision? A Report on
California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Felzen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 235,
243 (2000).
191. See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 12 (“[T]he 41% higher likelihood that
any publicly-traded company will face a suit going beyond a motion to dismiss
suggests that the plaintiffs’ bar is pursuing fraud more aggressively since PSLRA,
rather than being limited by it.”); Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, supra note 27. A case can be made that the PSLRA has been
somewhat effective in that the post-PSLRA average rate of non-voluntary dismissals
has increased, with a corresponding decrease in settlements. See Painter et al., supra
note 39, at 7. But see Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 5 (“Dismissal rates are
statistically unchanged since PSLRA, despite the new, more specific standard of
pleading that it set, with 12-13% of cases dismissed within three years both before
and after, and few dismissals in subsequent years.”). The average dollar amount of
each settlement is up. See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 7 (noting that average
settlements more than tripled from 1996 to the first half of 2003); Painter et al., supra
note 39, at 9-12. This dollar-value increase appears to be attributable to a few
extremely large (i.e., high dollar-value) settlements in individual cases. Id.
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2002 than in any other year for which data have been collected.
Based on data collected and analyzed by Stanford University and
Cornerstone Research, the number of securities class actions brought
in 2002 (other than initial public offering allocation cases) was 224,
up from 171 in 2001. Since 1995, the trend in securities class actions
193
has been stable to upward.
The mere commencement of securities fraud class action litigation
may have a measurable negative impact on the market value of the
194
stock of a corporate issuer.
Damages claims and settlement
amounts can be significant, and litigation costs are known to be
195
high. With a decreased market value, the corporate defendant may
192. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2002: A Year in
Review, available at Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, supra
note 27, at 2; see also Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 2 (noting the same trend based
on an analysis of different data).
193. See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 2; Stanford Law School Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27. This data also may indicate that the PSLRA has
failed to achieve its goals. Alternatively, the data may indicate the existence or
discovery of more securities fraud, rather than continued or growing speculative,
settlement-oriented litigation. It may be too early to tell which explanation carries
the greatest weight with respect to recent actions, since cases brought in any given
year settle out or otherwise devolve over a period of years. See Buckberg et al., supra
note 39, at 5 (noting that there “has been a slowing of time to disposition due to later
settlements” since adoption of the PSLRA). A recent paper suggests that market
conditions explain best “the amount of securities litigation in federal courts and the
type of allegations made in plaintiffs’ complaints.” Painter et al., supra note 39, at 6.
194. This seems intuitive. But see Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 65-66 (1991).
195. See Nicole M. Briski, Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and
Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 156 (2000) (“Once a securities fraud lawsuit
survives a motion to dismiss, the prohibitive cost of discovery provides an incentive
for a corporation to settle the lawsuit, regardless of the company's culpability.”);
Franco, supra note 142, at 336 n.231 (2002) (referencing arguments that securities
class action litigation overcompensates investors); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re
Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 782-83
(2000) (describing the costs to defendants in securities class action litigation); Jeffrey
L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1039 (2003)
(referencing “the enormous litigation costs involved in securities fraud class actions”
and their relationship to settlements); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 83 (“The Reform Act recognizes that
suboptimal liability standards and procedural rules in securities class actions impose
costs on issuers (good and bad) that are passed on to investors.”); Charles M. Yablon,
A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 567, 586-93 (2000) (discussing the relationships among damages claims,
settlements, and class action litigation costs); see also Janine C. Guido, Note, Seeking
Enlightenment From Above: Circuit Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act’s
Heightened Pleading Requirement, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 501, 506 (2000). One published
study documents average and median settlement values at $23.3 and $6.3 Million in
2002 and $14.1 and $5.1 Million in 2001, respectively. See Cornerstone Research,
Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements: 2001: A Year in Review, available at Stanford
Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27, at 2.
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find it more difficult to conduct or finance its operations. Customer
196
Debt and equity
and supplier relationships may be damaged.
financing in public and private markets may be unavailable or less
available; and institutional lenders may be unwilling or less willing to
197
loan the issuer operating funds on a cost-effective basis.
Accordingly, the availability and value of both short-term and longterm investments in the issuer may be reduced by the mere
commencement of a class action lawsuit.
Many securities class actions are settled before trial, and even
198
before adjudication of a motion to dismiss.
A number of factors
199
make settlement of these legal claims attractive to defendants.
Moreover, settlements are judicially encouraged—the earlier, the
200
better.
Yet, payments made by an issuer in settlement of a class
201
action lawsuit also represent a drain on stockholder value. In these
196. See Johnson et al., supra note 195, at 783 (“[T]he mere existence of the class
action may disrupt relationships with suppliers and customers, who may be somewhat
leery of dealing with a party accused of fraud.”).
197. Accord Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 581 (1991) (“From the perspective of the
capital markets, the economic costs of a non-merits-based system of resolving
securities class actions should cause increases in the cost of capital in the public
offering market and, to some degree, in the price of insurance.”); Dent, supra note
41; Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (concluding, with
respect to derivative and class action litigation, that “[t]he failure of prosecutors,
regulators, and the courts to seek legal rules with bright lines also raises the cost of
capital by generating costly litigation.”).
198. See supra note 191; Guido, supra note 195, at 506; see also O’Connor, supra
note 75, at 366 (noting that the uncertain legal standards relating to materiality may
cause defendants to settle). Although not the subject matter of this article, the large
number of settlements of securities fraud class actions may have legal effects on
issuers and insiders in addition to those provided for under the federal securities
laws. For example, amounts payable by corporate defendants in settlement of a
securities fraud claim are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
See 15 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(19) (2000).
199. These factors may include (i) the possibility of a large judgment for the
plaintiff class, (ii) a willingness to settle on the part of individual defendants, many of
whom control the defendant corporation, (iii) the liability of third-party insurers for
amounts paid in settlement of class actions, and (iv) the possibility that third-party
insurers will be obligated to pay amounts in excess of policy limits if they reject
settlements proposed by the parties. See Alexander, supra note 195, at 528-34, 548-68
(1991); see also Guido, supra note 197, at 506; Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon
Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud
Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1998); Yablon, supra note 195, at 586
(suggesting that a substantial number of “longshot” securities class action claims,
“coupled with litigation uncertainty, the availability of threshold motions to
defendants,” and risk aversion by both sides provide, . . . the best explanation of “the
high number, and low settlement value, of securities class actions.”).
200. See Maley v. Del Global Tech. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“In the context of a complex class action, early settlement has far-reaching benefits
in the judicial system.”); Mashburn v. Nat’l Health Care, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 660, 669
(M.D. Ala. 1988) (“The law is clear that early settlements are to be encouraged.”).
201. To the extent that settlement amounts are covered by available insurance,
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settlements, those who recover value as members of the plaintiff class
typically receive an offsetting benefit, albeit less than the damages
202
However, settlement amounts
they are alleged to have suffered.
earmarked for distribution to the plaintiff class benefit only members
of the plaintiff class; other investors suffer a loss of stockholder value
arising from the fraud or the litigation itself and receive no
203
compensation from the issuer. This result is especially damaging to
those who buy the issuer’s securities before commencement of the
class period and continue to hold the securities through the
204
settlement payment date.
If the issuer should decide to defend itself at trial rather than settle
with the plaintiff class, the issuer then would be forced to shoulder
other burdens. In addition to the operational costs resulting from
the management distractions, outside counsel fees, and
disbursements commonly associated with class action litigation
(similar in effect and likely far greater in magnitude to those
described above with respect to the materiality decision-making
process), the prolonged period of uncertainty about the issuer’s
potential judgment liability during the pendency of the trial may tend
205
to depress the overall market value of the firm.
B. Insider Trading Claims in the Securities Fraud Class Action
Environment
Suits alleging insider trading violations make up a significant
number of the overall securities fraud class actions brought in any
the drain on stockholder value is lessened. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning
of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 25 (“Testimony that preceded the enactment
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act estimated that 96 percent of securities
class action settlements were for amounts within the limits of available insurance
coverage.”); Yablon, supra note 195, at 579-80 (noting that most securities class
actions settle within applicable insurance policy limits). The issuer may, however,
have to pay a higher premium or settle for lesser coverage after an insurer pays off all
or part of a securities fraud class action settlement. See Alexander, supra note 197, at
581.
202. See supra note 185.
203. See Palmiter, supra note 195, at 83 (“The settlement of securities fraud class
actions—the nearly universal outcome in these cases—involves payment by the
company (existing shareholders) to the plaintiff class (a sub-group of existing or
former shareholders) and to the plaintiff's lawyers.”). These other investors may
include both those who opt out of the plaintiff class and those who lack standing to
be part of the plaintiff class because they did not purchase or sell securities during
the class period. See infra note 204.
204. These stockholders cannot be members of the plaintiff class because they
lack standing—they have not purchased or sold securities during the class period.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975).
205. See W. Kip Viscusi, Remarks of Featured Speaker, A Postmortem on the Cigarette
Settlement, 29 CUM. L. REV. 523, 545 (1998/1999) (noting similar effects in connection
with suits against the cigarette industry).
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given year and often are litigated as part of a larger action involving
206
alleged corporate fraud. Many factors contribute to this abundance
of insider trading claims among the many securities class action
lawsuits, including the ease with which alleged violations may be
identified and the permissive nature of certain provisions in the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (the
207
“ITSFEA”).
Insider trading is a (relatively) easily identifiable type of securities
fraud. This is because, under the “disclose or abstain” rule, the duty
to disclose is triggered by the mere existence of a securities trade by
the issuer or an insider, and the scienter requirement may be met by
the mere decision to trade while in knowing possession of nonpublic
208
information that is determined to be material. Accordingly, the key
fact in identifying a possible violation (other than the possession of
material nonpublic information) is the existence of a trading
transaction by the issuer or an insider. Existing public disclosure
requirements under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act make the task of
209
Once potentially
identifying trading transactions relatively easy.
206. Of the 224 securities class action filings made in 2002, 58 (or twenty-six
percent) included claims of insider trading. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class
Action Case Filings; 2002: A Year in Review, available at Stanford Law School Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27, at 17; see also Wager & Ward, supra note
39, at 17 (“More than 55 percent of new class action filings in 2001 contained
allegations of improper trading by insiders . . . .”).
207. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2003)).
208. See supra notes 44 & 59 and accompanying text.
209. See generally Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 n.11 (1st Cir.
1999) (noting that “[b]ecause insiders of a publicly traded company must regularly
file share ownership and trading reports with the SEC (on Forms 3, 4, 5, and
144), . . . information [regarding normal securities trading patterns] is readily
available to plaintiffs.”). After the end of each of its first three fiscal quarters (on
Form 10-Q) and its fiscal year (on Form 10-K), each issuer with a class of equity
securities registered under the 1934 Act must file with the SEC a periodic report that
includes certain financial information about the corporation, including (among
other things) specified financial statements for the issuer as at the end of that
quarter or year. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2003). The year-end filing includes full,
audited financial statements (including two years of balance sheet and three years of
income statements, among other things) with footnotes. See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2003).
Accordingly, at or before the time of filing of the year-end report, the issuer would
have publicly disclosed any sales or repurchases of its equity securities. Certain
insiders also have to comply with disclosure requirements. Before selling equity in a
corporation, certain officers, directors, and other persons controlling, controlled by,
or under common control with the corporation must file a Form 144 to report future
proposed sales of securities “if the amount of securities to be sold in reliance upon
the rule during any period of three months exceeds 500 shares or other units or has
an aggregate sale price in excess of $ 10,000.” See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (2003).
Also, officers, directors, and beneficial owners of ten percent or more of a class of
the corporation’s equity securities registered under the 1934 Act must report certain
information about most transactions in those securities after they occur-either by the
end of the second business day following the day on which the transaction is
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material nonpublic information has been identified, in many (if not
most) circumstances, a prospective class action plaintiff or attorney
can use these public filings to determine whether an issuer or insider
may have traded while in possession of that information. Conversely,
once a public filing has reported a proposed or actual trading
transaction, a prospective class action plaintiff or attorney need only
identify the issuer’s or insider’s awareness of potentially material
nonpublic information in order to identify the key facts for its
pleadings.
Congress also has given prospective plaintiffs a clearer path to
private actions (including class actions) alleging insider trading
violations. In 1988, with the adoption of the ITSFEA, persons
engaging in trading transactions contemporaneous with insider
210
trading acquired an express statutory right of action.
Within the
first two years after adoption of the ITSFEA, one scholar noted the
following as a plaintiff-oriented effect of this provision, among others:
“. . . private attorneys . . . sue in those insider trading cases that
211
promise ‘the largest judgment in the least amount of time.’” One
might reform this observation for purposes of the current class action
environment by replacing the word “judgment” with the word
“settlement.”
In this environment, then, many lawsuits alleging insider trading
are brought and many of those are settled. Ambiguities in the
existing materiality standard may make it more likely that an issuer or
insider will want to settle with the plaintiff class early on (rather than
suffer through a trial involving complex and uncertain elements of
212
proof), especially with courts encouraging early settlements.
Moreover, long and protracted defenses of insider trading allegations
have the capacity to distract management from the operations of the
issuer and run up large legal costs, further impacting stockholder
213
value.
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs are incentivized to
bring insider trading class actions in circumstances where it is not
clear—or even probable—that the nonpublic information possessed
executed (on Form 4) or by the 45th day after the end of the corporation’s fiscal year
in which the transaction occurred (on Form 5). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2003).
Finally, beneficial owners of five percent or more of a class of the corporation’s
equity securities registered under the 1934 Act must report material increases and
decreases in that beneficial ownership promptly after they occur. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-2(a) (2003).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2003).
211. O’Connor, supra note 75, at 371.
212. See sources cited supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (including data
on the high rate of settlement of securities fraud class action litigation).
213. See Viscusi, supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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by the trading issuer or insider is material.
Clearer materiality
guidance should both limit this incentive to sue and make early
dismissal of private insider trading actions more probable.
C. The Need for Substantive Reform
To date, general securities class action litigation reform largely has
215
been procedural or quasi-procedural in nature.
The adopted
reforms have not reduced the number or settlement value of
securities class actions brought. It is time to give consideration to
broad-based substantive reform to clarify U.S. insider trading
regulation. This reform need not involve federal legislation and can
be fashioned to have impact both in and outside the class action
environment. The SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2 in
the summer of 2000 represents a step in this direction in the context
216
of U.S. insider trading regulation.
Why not continue along these
lines by providing enhanced guidance on materiality in that context?
As noted above, greater clarity in defining materiality logically
should cause a reduction in the number of insider trading class
actions filed or should result in the dismissal of more of these cases
on a pretrial motion. Specifically, after the adoption of effective
materiality guidance, a class action based on the failure by an issuer
or insider to disclose nonpublic information in connection with a
214. Of course, the plaintiff’s access to the courts is not wholly unfettered.
Counsel to the plaintiff class must act in accordance with all applicable rules of
attorney conduct and professional responsibility in bringing and settling any insider
trading litigation.
215. There are certain notable exceptions, however.
Professor Leubsdorf
summarized the overall landscape in this area as follows:
Although class action law is moving in substantive directions, procedure may
still have a hand on the wheel. Often, indeed, it is hard to separate changes
in substantive law from class action changes, particularly in areas where class
actions have become the predominant remedy. . . . The “safe harbor”
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 contain no
procedural or remedial clauses, but would they have been enacted without
the growth in securities class action that made securities litigation important
to corporate management?
The congressional origin of most class action changes links with their
substantive impetus. Procedural rulemakers have continued to write general,
transsubstantive rules. Because so many groups have conflicting interests in
class action rules, no consensus supporting significant class action changes of
transsubstantive impact has arisen. Interest groups seeking narrower changes
have found Congress a more receptive audience whether the changes they
sought were substantive, procedural, or both.
John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 455 (1997)
(footnotes omitted). An important recent procedural reform impacting securities
fraud class actions, including actions alleging insider trading, is the extension of the
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions (among others) enacted as part of
Sarbanes-Oxley. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2003).
216. See infra note 219.
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purchase or sale of securities would survive a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment (if any) if the undisclosed nonpublic information
is material under new, more precise guidance. Similarly, after
adoption of effective materiality guidance, a defendant should be
able to prevail on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if any
and all undisclosed information in the possession of the subject issuer
or insider is immaterial under that definition. Yet, certain actions
would survive summary judgment and still not result in a materiality
ruling favoring the plaintiffs. That is because it is impossible to
achieve complete legal certainty and predictability of end results at
this stage in the proceedings— except under a bright-line rule (which
217
is not being advocated here). However, by enhancing certainty and
predictability of result, effective materiality guidance may result in
fewer insider trading class action settlements, and the value of any
settlements should better reflect actual, rather than speculative (or
nuisance), measures of value.
Of course, where definitions important to a rule of law are
clarified, unintended loopholes are likely to be identified and
exploited by those who desire to push that rule of law to its logical—
or illogical—extreme.
Nevertheless, the benefits of clarity to
transaction planners, litigants, and courts outweigh this possible
218
detriment. Moreover, a thoughtful, careful decisional and drafting
process to more precisely define materiality should minimize this
detrimental effect.
VI. A PROPOSAL
Fair and honest securities markets, investor confidence in those
markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure in the insider
trading regulation context can be enhanced by the adoption of more
precise guidance as to information that is material. Whether that
guidance comes in the form of legislation, SEC rulemaking, SEC

217. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
218. In this regard, on a more general note, Professor Grzebielski observed that:
while rules perhaps cannot define precisely what does and does not violate
the law, a greater specific content can be given through them than by relying
on the provisions of ubiquitous rule 10b-5. The expansive interpretations
which the courts and the Commission have often afforded rule 10b-5 permit
its use to reach almost any conduct related to the purchase or sale of
securities that is deemed unfair. If rule 10b-5 is to be a catchall, it should be
used to reach conduct not already specifically regulated, rather than to
swallow up the entire field.
Ray J. Grzebielski, A Response to Roberta Karmel’s Call for a New Direction in Federal
Securities Regulation: Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange Commission
vs. Corporate America, 57 TUL. L. REV. 930, 937 (1983).
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interpretive advice, or (at a bare minimum) more methodical,
rigorous decision making in the courts, enhanced guidance is
219
The question then becomes how those guidelines
warranted.
should be constructed.
A. Suggested Approach to Fashioning Appropriate Materiality Guidance
In fashioning materiality guidance, it is important first to
determine the specific objective to be served by that guidance. The
factual scenarios in which an issuer or insider may trade securities
while in possession of nonpublic information are limitless.
220
Accordingly, it is unrealistic (and arguably undesirable ) to expect
to fashion guidance that authoritatively defines what is “material” for
every possible set of facts in every possible subject matter area in the
insider trading context. An alternative goal, not inconsistent with the
PSLRA, is to fashion guidance designed to afford both private
investors (as prospective private action plaintiffs) and issuers and
their insiders (as putative defendants) more clarity and certainty.
Specifically, this guidance would aid litigants and their counsel in
determining whether to bring and how to respond to complaints,
motions to dismiss, or motions for summary judgment based on
knowledge of recurring fact patterns in key subject matter areas. This
objective is both attainable and useful to litigants and others in
addressing the identified disadvantages associated with the current
221
lack of clarity and precision in determining materiality.

219. A separate article could be written about the benefits and detriments of each
possible legislative, administrative, and judicial approach to formulating and issuing
guidance on materiality in the insider trading context. That scholarly work, which
logically would integrate principles of legislation, administrative law, and
jurisprudence (among other disciplines), must be left for another day. Even without
the benefit of that further analysis, however, one logically might place the initial
responsibility for this effort in the hands of the SEC for two reasons. First, the SEC
has express authority to adopt regulations under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003). Second, the SEC recently has issued specific guidance on
other definitional issues in the insider trading area through its adoption of Rule
10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2
(2003). The proposal forwarded in this Part represents a logical extension of these
earlier SEC initiatives.
220. Bright-line tests may limit the ability of private and public enforcement to
adapt to new circumstances, sealing off opportunities to proscribe or punish conduct
that, while not foreseen, is intended to be regulated. The Basic Court, for example,
did not find much merit in the arguments favoring a bright-line test for materiality.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.
221. Despite the litigation-oriented nature of this objective, guidance fashioned
along these lines should be useful to transaction planners, enforcement agents, and
judges, as well as litigation counsel, since it more directly focuses both ex ante and ex
post factual inquiries and analyses.
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1.

Recognizing the “disclose or abstain” rule for what it is
In sum and substance, the “disclose or abstain” rule governing
insider trading under Rule 10b-5 functions as a transaction-triggered
mandatory disclosure rule without any existing line-item content
222
guidance.
Said another way, issuers and insiders know that they
must disclose all material nonpublic information then in their
possession, but there are no content-oriented disclosure rules directly
applicable to their disclosure obligation (as there are with respect to
other transactional disclosure rules relating to, for example, public
offerings and federally regulated tender offers). Accordingly, it
seems logical to approach the task of issuing materiality guidance in
the insider trading context as one would approach materiality
223
guidance in the context of any line-item mandatory disclosure rule.
The process of constructing materiality guidance logically involves,
for each subject matter area or factual context in which guidance is to
be provided, the identification of the elements of materiality in that
subject matter area or factual context in the insider trading
environment, and a recognition of the ways in which the materiality
of specific information in that area or context and that environment
can be measured.
Each materiality element and method of
measurement then would be incorporated into guidance on
materiality for that subject matter area or factual context.
2.

An existing regulatory example
The materiality elements and measuring methods used in existing
mandatory disclosure rules are best illustrated by an example. Item
224
11(c) of Form S-1 calls for the disclosure of “legal proceedings” in
accordance with Item 103 of Regulation S-K (“Item 103”) in
225
connection with a public offering of securities. In that connection,
222. See supra note 29. After significant guidance is created around specific
categories of material information, it may make sense to collect that guidance in an
SEC-promulgated disclosure document designed to allow issues or insiders to report
material information in connection with a corporate or insider trading transaction
that is not otherwise reported under existing SEC rules and regulations. See supra
note 209 (summarizing briefly certain existing SEC rules and regulations governing
disclosure responsibilities).
223. See Franco, supra note 142. This approach to constructing materiality
guidance (and, in fact, the desirability (regarding information about the interaction
of mandatory disclosure rules and antifraud provisions) and efficacy of enhanced
materiality guidance of any form) rests, in part, on arguments supportive of
mandatory disclosure rules under the securities laws as a whole.
224. See Securities Act Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/s-1.htm (last visited July 7, 2003).
Form S-1 is the basic registration form under the 1933 Act that is generally used
when no other form is available.
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003). The text of the rule consists of the following

HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

10/28/2003 2:09 PM

1194

[Vol. 52:1131

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

226

the instructions to Item 103 offer guidance as to what is material.
The three key elements of materiality identified in those instructions
include:
(i) the extent to which the proceeding typically
accompanies the issuer’s business; (ii) the financial effect on the
issuer of a damages claim; and (iii) the substantive nature of the
proceeding.
Methods for measuring materiality vary from element to element.
For example, as to typicality, Instruction 1 to Item 103 advises the
issuer that no action for negligence or other claim ordinarily
resulting from the business of the issuer is required to be described
227
“unless it departs from the normal kind of such actions.” As to the
financial effect on the issuer of a damages claim, Instruction 2 to
Item 103 states that the issuer need not disclose information about a
proceeding if the proceeding “involves primarily a claim for
damages” and “the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs,
does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets” of the issuer and its
228
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. The issuer must aggregate the
amount involved in all proceedings presenting “the same legal and

brief mandate:
Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary
routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of
its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject.
Include the name of the court or agency in which the proceedings are
pending, the date instituted, the principal parties thereto, a description of
the factual basis alleged to underlie the proceeding and the relief sought.
Include similar information as to any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities.
Id. In explaining the use of materiality in this and other mandatory disclosure rules,
one scholar states:
[W]hile Regulation S-K identifies specific information to be disclosed, in
many cases that information is further “filtered” through the screen of
materiality. So, for instance, in describing the legal proceedings facing a
company under Item 103, issuers are required to “[d]escribe briefly any
material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation
incidental to the business . . . .” The instructions to Item 103 further (and
helpfully) set out a materiality benchmark of 10% of the current assets of the
issuer, except in an environmental proceeding against a government entity,
in which case proceedings with the possibility of a $100,000 fine must be
disclosed. When the regulation does not specifically provide a materiality
benchmark, the general materiality standard prevails. Under this general
standard, information is defined as material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would deem the information significant
in the total mix of available information. Thus, Regulation S-K defines an
issuer’s disclosure obligations generally, as filtered through the “materiality”
screen.
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
226. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003); see Williams, supra note 225.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003).
228. Id.
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factual issues” for calculation purposes.
Finally, Instructions 3, 4,
and 5 to Item 103 highlight for consideration three types of legal
proceedings garnering special attention in making materiality
determinations under Item 103:
(x) material bankruptcy, receivership, or similar
proceedings;
(y) material proceedings to which any director, officer,
affiliate, or five-percent beneficial owner of the issuer, or any
associate of any of the foregoing,
(i) is a party adverse to the issuer or a subsidiary of the
issuer or
(ii) has a material interest adverse to the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer; and
230
(z) environmental proceedings.
Notwithstanding Instructions 1 and 2 to Item 103, the proceedings
231
described in items (x) and (y) are required to be disclosed.
Proceedings described in item (z) are required to be disclosed based
on the existence of any one of three alternative states of facts:
(1) the materiality of the proceeding to the issuer’s business
or financial condition;
(2) the magnitude of the damages claim (in a damages suit),
monetary sanctions, capital expenses, deferred charges, or
charges to income to which the issuer may be subject, based
on the same percentage-of-assets test articulated in
Instruction 2 of Item 103; or
(3) the issuer’s belief as to the magnitude of monetary
sanctions, exclusive of interest and costs, that may be assessed
against the issuer in a proceeding or group of proceedings to
232
which a governmental authority is a party.

229. Id.
230. Id. Unfortunately, in defining material legal proceedings, these instructions
use the word “material” without defining it. See Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished
Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1965 (1995) (noting that
materiality is not defined in Item 103). At best, the use in a definition of an illdefined term that is, itself, part of the term being defined apparently violates a triedand-true rule of writing typically taught to students in U.S. primary and secondary
schools: In defining a term, never use the term itself in the definition. See Renah R.
Holmes, First Amendment Rights: May A School Ban Religious Symbols that Are Arguably
Gang-Related?, 27 J.L. & EDUC., 511, 514, 515 (1998) (noting a court’s application of
this rule). Although “material” is used in these instructions to modify a narrower
category of information than “litigation” (i.e., bankruptcy, receivership, and selfdealing proceedings), this approach has little to recommend to it in terms of clarity
and precision.
231. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003).
232. Id. (using, again, the term “material” in the instructions); see Williams, supra
note 225 (detailing the role of materiality in the disclosure of legal proceedings).
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Although the materiality inquiry under Item 103 for purposes of
233
the Form S-1 registration statement does not end here; the
instructions to Item 103 provide important materiality guidance to
transaction planners, litigants, and courts in the context of the rule.
3.

Defining the key elements of materiality and methods of measurement in
the insider trading context
Unlike Item 103 (which references material legal proceedings), the
insider trading “disclose or abstain” rule references a significantly
more amorphous and wide-ranging area for disclosure—material
nonpublic information. Accordingly, identifying the key elements of
materiality applicable to specific subject matter areas or factual
context in the insider trading contexts is a more difficult, broadbased task. The key operative question in each subject matter area or
factual context derives from the applicable legal standard: what types
of undisclosed information about the issuer is a reasonable investor
substantially likely to find important in making an investment
decision with respect to an issuer’s securities at a time when the issuer
or one of its insiders is permitted to trade in the issuer’s securities? A
number of common, general elements quickly come to mind. These
include: (a) the actual or potential impact of the information on the
financial condition or results of operations of the issuer (“financial
234
impact,”); (b) the actual or potential impact of the information on
the business or operations of the issuer, including the actual or
potential impact of the information on the management of the issuer
235
(“operational impact”);
and (c) the age or currency of the
233. The instructions to Item 103 are not exclusive. For example, a third-party
non-environmental action for negligence or other claim not ordinarily resulting
from the business of the issuer is not necessarily material (and need not be
disclosed), even if the amount in controversy exceeds ten percent of the current
assets of the issuer. Materiality also has a general meaning in the context of these
mandatory disclosure rules that is codified in the rules and regulations under the
1933 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2003) (defining materiality for required
disclosures under the 1933 Act); id. § 240.12b-2 (2003) (giving the same definition of
materiality for required disclosures under the 1934 Act). Moreover, both the 1933
Act, as pertains to registration statements, and the 1934 Act, as pertains to periodic
and current reports or transaction disclosure statements, require disclosure of any
material information not expressly called for by line-item disclosure rules if
“necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.” See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2003); id. § 240.12b20 (2003).
234. See Fedders, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that materiality on the basis of
financial impact is commonly referred to as “quantitative materiality”); Seligman,
supra note 230, at 1965 (“The concept of quantitative materiality typically involves a
percentage of a corporation's assets, earnings, sales, or other numerical
benchmarks.”).
235. See Fedders, supra note 13, at 41 (illustrating quantitative materiality by
reference to management or other operational effects); Seligman, supra note 230, at
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information (“informational currency”). In specific subject matter
areas or factual contexts, one or more of these elements may be
237
important; some almost necessarily overlap. This is a useful, albeit
general, list of elements to consider in beginning to fashion
appropriate materiality guidance.
The method for measuring materiality based on each applicable
element also may vary with the specific subject matter area or factual
context in which materiality is being determined. For example,
certain measures of financial impact may relate principally to effects
238
on an issuer’s balance sheet, and not its income statement.
Any
measurement method, however, must comply with existing statutory
and decisional law, as well as applicable rules and regulations.
Accordingly, among other things, the measurement method must be
objective; it must measure, in some way, the importance of the
239
information to the reasonable investor.
There exist a number of sources for applicable elements of
materiality and methods of measurement that are instructive in
creating more precise materiality guidance in the insider trading
context. Because insider trading regulation under Rule 10b-5 relates
to the need for disclosure in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security, line-item disclosure rules already adopted by the SEC for
use in the context of purchases or sales of securities represent a key
240
(if somewhat generic) source of materiality guidance. For example,
1965 (noting as examples of qualitative materiality “matters such as managerial
conflicts of interest or violations of law”).
236. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301-229.303 (2002) (detailing various time
requirements applicable to the disclosure of specified financial information).
237. For example, operational impact frequently (but not always) will be
accompanied by actual or presumed financial impact. See SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, supra note 32; see also Miller, supra note 26, at 383 (“SAB No. 99
demands that auditors use qualitative elements to illuminate and expand the
traditional quantitative materiality analysis, not undertake a qualitative analysis
completely divorced from the quantitative analysis.”).
238. See, e.g., supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the asset test
under Regulations S-K Item 103).
239. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
240. In point of fact, the line-item mandatory disclosure rules are both underinclusive and over-inclusive. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1056-57. Cf. Steven G.
Sanders, Comment: Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of Preliminary
Merger Negotiations After In re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 BROOK.. L. REV. 175, 234 (1993)
(noting that “mandatory disclosure requirements . . . do not predicate disclosure
upon materiality”). On the one hand, required disclosures may be insufficient in
conveying all material facts, as determined under existing law, about a particular
matter; more information may need to be disclosed to satisfy materiality
requirements. See Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741, 770-73 (2001) (explaining a
presumption, expressed in cases and other legal resources, that the information
required to be disclosed under line-item disclosure rules is material); Franco, supra
note 142, at 291-92 (“[M]andatory disclosure makes antifraud regulation more
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disclosure rules for issuer-tender offers (purchases by the issuer of its
own securities) can be instructive with respect to issuer or insider
purchase transactions. Moreover, disclosure rules relating to public
or private offerings of securities may be helpful in determining
materiality in the context of issuer or insider securities dispositions.
Line-item disclosure rules applicable to periodic reporting and other
statutory and regulatory reporting requirements (e.g., Form 144
under Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, and reports on Forms 3, 4, and 5
241
under Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act) also may be instructive under
certain circumstances because they are intended to effectively inform
market participants of important information regarding the trading
242
of issuers and insiders in an issuer’s securities.
Existing decisional law is another valuable source for more
concrete materiality measurement principles. For example, certain

potent as a signaling mechanism by establishing a minimum disclosure flooraffirmative disclosure requirements . . . .”). This has been true, for example, in the
area of required management disclosures of prior legal proceedings under Item
401(f) of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. 229.401(f) (2003). See Haskell v. Wilson, [19911992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,543 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding
fifteen year-old securities violations material where line-item disclosure requires a
five-year look-back); Bertoglio v. Tex. Int’l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 661 (D. Del. 1980)
(reasoning that a history of violations are material because of their chronic nature,
even if these violations are fifteen years old); Securities Act Release No. 5,758, [19761977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,783, at 87,031 (Nov. 2, 1976)
(averring that events occurring outside the five-year disclosure period “may be
material and should be disclosed”). But see SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no violation of Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act where
the registrant failed to disclose a seventeen-year old embezzlement conviction and a
just-more-than five-year-old securities violation). The “gap-filler” materiality rules
under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act expressly recognize that the line-item disclosure
rules may not call for the disclosure of all material information. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.408 (2002); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2002). On the other hand, certain line-item
disclosure rules may compel disclosure of facts beyond those that are material for
Rule 10b-5 purposes. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)
(regarding Item 303 of Regulation S-K); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1200 n.26 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting the SEC’s authority “to
require registrants to disclose ‘nonmaterial’ but economically significant
information.”); John W. Bagby et al., How Green was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate
Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 271 (1995) (noting that
critics of the SEC’s environmental disclosure rules believe that they require
disclosure of immaterial information); Sanders, supra note 240, at 217 n.207
(indicating that the SEC may require disclosure of information that is immaterial).
This under- and over-inclusiveness may be the inevitable result of the generic, onesize-fits-all manner in which mandatory disclosure rules are drafted. See generally
Sanders, supra note 240, at 209-23 (1993) (providing an interesting, albeit somewhat
dated, discussion of the interplay between mandatory disclosure rules and materiality
in a specific context).
241. See supra note 30.
242. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (contending that the regulation of
insider trading under Rule 10b-5 is a form of disclosure regulation); see also supra
notes 151 & 153 and accompanying text (noting that unregulated insider trading
may lead to greater accuracy in the market price of securities).
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fact patterns repeat themselves in cases decided by a number of
243
These courts may have
different federal district or circuit courts.
identified applicable materiality elements and used methods of
measurement that Congress, the SEC, or other courts can use in
providing more specific advice on materiality.
The areas of
materiality analysis in which these common fact patterns arise
represent excellent choices for subject matter areas in which more
precise materiality guidance should be given.
Once information is assembled in a particular subject matter area
regarding the appropriate measures and elements of materiality, the
author of the guidance (whether that be Congress, the SEC, or the
courts) may avail itself of this information to better define materiality
using, for example, rebuttable presumptions or per se rules regarding
244
materiality or immateriality.
The nature and quality of the
guidance that can be provided necessarily may be limited in some
respects by materiality interpretations under existing law and
regulation, except where the authority issuing the guidance chooses
to exercise the authority to overrule that law or regulation (as
applicable).
B. Application of the Suggested Approach to the Two Examples
To illustrate the operation of this suggested approach to fashioning
materiality guidance, let us return to the two examples set forth in
Part II.A of this Article. Applying the suggested approach, Congress,
the SEC, or the courts could provide clearer and more precise
materiality guidance useful in each of the subject matter areas
245
represented by the examples.
243. See supra note 48 (noting that the examples presented and analyzed supra
Part II, and also used infra part VI.B, have been chosen, in part, for their typicality).
244. Although it is easy to see how the clarity of per se rules could positively impact
stockholder value, it may be harder to understand how presumptions could be
similarly beneficial. To obtain the level of precision needed to warrant the cost
associated with ex ante regulation, any presumptions associated with materiality
guidance must be accompanied by specific factors allowing for rebuttal of those
presumptions. The proposal set forth in this article incorporates this principle as an
essential element.
245. The application of the suggested approach to the two examples set forth in
this article is not intended to provide complete, final guidance, but rather a
preliminary basis for thought and discussion on appropriate guidance. As such,
many details, including those relating to the precise manner in which quantitative
and qualitative measures of materiality might be integrated, remain to be
determined. The specific illustrations should provide those who favor enhanced
materiality guidance with a tangible foothold in accomplishing their objectives—a
framework that gives legislators, regulators, and the judiciary an incentive to
proceed. Even if the application of the suggested drafting approach to the examples
does not meet these lofty objectives, at the very least, consideration of these
illustrations, by reference to existing mandatory disclosure rules, enables us to take
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1.

Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting
The Corporation in Example #1 has overstated its assets by an
amount equal to two percent of its total assets because its booked
reserves were inadequate. This information was not publicly available
at the time the CFO sold the Corporation’s securities; however, this
information was or should have been known to the CFO at the time
of the sale transaction. Example #1 relates primarily to financial
impact and, more specifically, a misstatement on the Corporation’s
balance sheet.
Reserves are understated, so assets are
correspondingly overstated. Other financial statements, we shall
246
assume, are not significantly impacted by this misstatement.
Precise guidance on the method of measuring the materiality of
misstatements of or changes in assets is not widespread in the
247
mandatory disclosure rules. Since the release of SAB No. 99,
however, it has been clear that, in determining the materiality of
financial misstatements, “quantifying, in percentage terms, the
magnitude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of
materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full
248
Specifically, SAB No. 99
analysis of all relevant considerations.”
references the acknowledged use of a five-percent quantitative
threshold used by accountants and executive officers prior to the
adoption of SAB No. 99. Omissions and misstatements under that
threshold amount were, according to SAB No. 99, routinely
determined to be per se immaterial “in the absence of particularly
egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by
249
senior management.”
SAB No. 99 rejects that approach to
determining materiality in favor of a combined quantitative and
qualitative analysis, but SAB No. 99 does not provide details on the
substance of that combined analysis. SAB No. 99 does include a list
250
of relevant qualitative considerations, several of which are or may
another hard look at the sufficiency of existing mandatory disclosure rules in
transactional and periodic reporting.
246. In an effort to prevent this part of the article from resulting in a detailed
accounting analysis, an overly simplistic asset-oriented fact pattern has been chosen
as a basis for Example #1. An adjustment to the Corporation’s income statement
likely would be made as a result of corrections to be required to be made to the
Corporation’s balance sheet; however, the reader is asked to assume that the income
statement adjustment would represent a de minimis change to the Corporation’s
revenues.
247. See generally SEC SAB No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (referenced
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
248. Id. at 45,151.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 45,152. In this regard, SAB No. 99 states as follows:
Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively
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be present here, but the list is nonexclusive and the various listed
considerations are not weighted in terms of their significance to the
overall materiality determination. Accordingly, SAB No. 99 does not
provide sufficient guidance in determining the materiality of the
Corporation’s failure to properly account for its reserves and assets.
Several important asset-based touchstones do exist, however. Item
2 of Form 8-K under the 1934 Act mandates disclosure of certain
information regarding the acquisition or disposition by the registrant
of “a significant amount of assets, otherwise than in the ordinary

small misstatement of a financial statement item are—
• Whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise
measurement or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of
imprecision inherent in the estimate.
• Whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends.
• Whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus
expectations for the enterprise.
• Whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa.
• Whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the
registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role in
the registrant’s operations or profitability.
• Whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with
regulatory requirements.
• Whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan
covenants or other contractual requirements.
• Whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s
compensation—for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of
bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation.
• Whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful
transaction.
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the
materiality of a quantitatively small misstatement. Among other factors, the
demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to
certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors
regard quantitatively small misstatements as material . . . .
When . . .
management or the independent auditor expects (based, for example, on a
pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a
significant positive or negative market reaction, that expected reaction
should be taken into account when considering whether a misstatement is
material.
Id. (footnotes omitted). This list and commentary can be incorporated into more
specific materiality guidance in the insider trading context, as needed. The SEC
later issued further non-specific materiality guidance that also may be of some help
to issuers and insiders. The SEC’s release concerning Regulation FD includes a
nonexclusive list of events, circumstances, and information that may be material. See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 32.
251. For example, the facts of Example #1 raise the possibility that (i) the
misstatement arises from an estimate, requiring an assessment of the degree of
imprecision inherent in the estimate, (ii) the misstatement concerns a segment or
other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a
significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability, and (iii) the
misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation by increasing
the value of the employee stock options exercised by the CFO.
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course of business.” Instruction 4 to Item 2 of Form 8-K informs us
that an acquisition or disposition involves “a significant amount of
assets (i) if the registrant’s and its other subsidiaries’ equity in the net
book value of such assets or the amount paid or received
therefore . . . exceeded 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant
and its consolidated subsidiaries, or (ii) if it involved a business . . .
which is significant . . . [under paragraphs (b) and (d) of Item 11-01
253
of Regulation S-X].”
If these mandatory disclosure rules only
require interim public disclosure of dispositions of more than ten
percent of a registrant’s assets, why should we require interim public
disclosure of a decrease in two percent of the Corporation’s total
assets in the insider trading context posited by Example #1?
Materiality guidance in the context of insider trading should at least
take into account the measurement of asset significance in the Form
8-K filing requirement, or consideration must be given to the
modification of that requirement.
In addition, Item 404 of Regulation S-K mandates disclosure of
transactions between an issuer and any director nominee or current
director of the issuer, where the “nominee or director is, or during
the last fiscal year has been, an executive officer of, or owns, or
during the last fiscal year has owned, of record or beneficially in
excess of ten percent equity interest in, any business or professional
entity to which the registrant or its subsidiaries was indebted at the
end of the registrant’s last full fiscal year in an aggregate amount in
excess of five percent of the registrant’s total consolidated assets at

252. SEC Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/forms/8-k.htm. In general, Form 8-K requires disclosure of asset
dispositions at this level. A registrant may voluntarily disclose a disposition of assets at
a lower level of financial significance under Item 5 of Form 8-K.
253. Id. Item 11-01 of Regulation S-X requires the presentation of pro forma
financial information: (i) in the event of the acquisition of a business constituting,
among other things, more than twenty percent (based either on investments in and
advancements to the business or on a proportionate share of the total assets of the
business) of the total consolidated assets of a registrant and its subsidiaries as of the
end of the most recently completed fiscal year; or (ii) in the event of the disposition
of a business constituting ten percent (based either on investments in and
advancements to the business or on a proportionate share of the total assets of the
business) of the total consolidated assets of a registrant and its subsidiaries as of the
end of the most recently completed fiscal year. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.11-01(b), (d)
(2003); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02(w)(1)-(2) (2003). The ten percent tests derive from
the definition of “significant subsidiary” in Regulation S-X. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.102(w) (2003). The term “significant subsidiary” is also used and defined in the rules
and regulations under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2
(2003). These “significant subsidiary” definitions also include a ten percent income
statement test not referenced here (because Example #1, on its facts, raises no
significant income statement issues). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02(w)(3), 230.405,
240.12b-2 (2003).
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the end of such fiscal year.” Under this disclosure rule, a liability in
excess of five percent of assets is deemed significant under
255
circumstances that indicate insider self-interest.
Existing decisional law also can play an important role in crafting
more precise materiality guidance applicable to Example #1. As
noted above, the facts in Example #1 are based in part on the facts
256
found by the court in Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc. In that case, the
court upheld a Rule 12 dismissal of the action because, among other
things, a two-percent overstatement of assets in connection with a
“high risk/high yield investment opportunity in a company with a
history of very rapid growth” was not material as a matter of law
because disclosure of the overstatement would not have significantly
257
altered the total mix of information available to investors.
The
court also relied on the “bespeaks caution” doctrine in rendering its
258
Parnes has been cited with approval on
judgment on materiality.
this point, with specific reference to the two-percent asset
259
overstatement.
Based on the foregoing materiality guidance on improper balance
sheet accounting, could be constructed so that it: (i) renders per se
material all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts
exceeding ten percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken
individually or collectively for any given reporting period), based on
the most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer; (ii) presumes
material all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts
exceeding five percent (but not in excess of ten percent) of an

254. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(b)(3) (2003).
255. See id. In the insider trading context, it may fairly be said that self-interest
always exists because of the issuer’s or insider’s involvement in a securities trading
transaction. See Langevoort, supra note 131, at 1328 (“Because the riches from insider
trading can be so great and the opportunity to ‘pull it off’ otherwise so simple for
those with special access to sensitive information, insider trading poses the
quintessential temptation in a larger company to pursue self- interest rather than stay
in role as a habitually virtuous fiduciary.”).
256. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
257. See id. at 546-48 (noting “[t]ere are a variety of reasons why an alleged
misrepresentation or omission may, as a matter of law, be immaterial” and citing to
some of those reasons).
258. See id. at 548-49. The “bespeaks caution” doctrine permits the court to
render immaterial any statement that is accompanied by specific, meaningful
cautionary language. Id. at 548.
259. See Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2002) (“In Gateway
2000, we upheld a Rule 12 dismissal because a two percent overstatement of assets by
a high-risk/high-yield investment opportunity would not have significantly altered
the total mix of information available to a reasonable investor.”); see also Blatt v. Muse
Techs., Inc., Nos. Civ.A. 01-11010-DPW, Civ. A. 01-12173-DPW, 2002 WL 31107537,
*30 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002) (citing to Parnes and including a parenthetical
reference describing the basic facts and resolution of the case).
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issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken individually or collectively for
any given reporting period), based on the most recently reported
balance sheet of the issuer (which presumption is rebuttable by the
trading issuer or insider based on a list of specified factors derived
from current law and regulation); and (iii) presumes immaterial all
asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts equal to or
less than five percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken
individually or collectively for any given total reporting period),
based on the most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer
(which presumption is rebuttable by an investor plaintiff or
prosecutor based on a list of specified factors derived from current
260
law and regulation).
2.

Example #2—Failed merger discussions
Example #2 raises issues of financial impact, operational impact,
and informational currency, all in one factual package. Specifically,
the facts of Example #2 relate to trading in Target’s securities by
directors of Target in light of undisclosed past, spurned offers made
by Acquiror for the acquisition of Target. All acquisitions, as
extraordinary corporate transactions, have an undeniable (even if
unpredictable and, in some cases, indefinable) effect on the financial
condition and results of operations of the acquisition target and the
business and operations of that target; including the continued
261
engagement and employment of the target’s management.
Accordingly, the existence of a plan, proposal, discussion, or
negotiation relating to or resulting in an issuer’s acquisition is always
a matter for serious consideration by transaction planners and courts
262
under the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test.
260. This list of factors should take into consideration, for example, the factors set
forth in SAB No. 99. See supra note 250. Admittedly, reliance on a rebuttable
presumption of immateriality, at any threshold level, may appear inconsistent with
SAB No. 99, in that SAB No. 99 requires that all materiality determinations be made
based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria. Id. However, the referenced lists
of factors will permit (and are designed to compel) consideration of tailored
qualitative criteria.
261. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Since a
merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a
small corporation’s life, to wit, its death, we think that inside information, as regards
a merger of this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case
as regards lesser transactions—and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in
such formative stages is doubtless high.”).
262. See Kitch, supra note 61, at 823. Professor Kitch notes that:
In the insider-trading context, it is inconceivable with respect to
negotiations, specifically, that the Court would hold that merger
negotiations were not material. The issue is whether an insider, knowing that
merger negotiations were underway and looking to the consummation of a
merger at a significant premium over the price of the issuer’s stock, could
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Of course, where a target corporation is engaging in transaction
planning in the wake of a mere proposal for an acquisition, even if
made at a specific price, the financial impact and operating impact of
the proposal and any subsequent acquisition are highly speculative
and difficult to measure. Existing disclosure rules in this area
measure the need for disclosure first by focusing primarily on the
type of transaction proposed. For example, under Item 1006(c)(1)
263
264
of Regulation M-A, referenced in Item 6 of Schedule TO, an
265
issuer engaging in an issuer tender offer must “describe any plans,
proposals or negotiations that relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny
extraordinary transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or
266
267
liquidation. . . .”
Similarly, Item 1005(b) of Regulation M-A, as
268
incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO, requires that a thirdparty tender offeror disclose “any negotiations, transactions or
material contacts during the past two years between the filing person
[offeror] . . . and the subject company [target] or its affiliates
concerning any (1) [m]erger; (2) [c]onsolidation; (3) [a]cquisition;
(4) [t]ender offer for or other acquisition of any class of the subject
proceed to purchase shares of the issuer on the market. Obviously not,
because the fact of merger negotiations is the kind of confidential material
that insiders should not be permitted to exploit for their own gain.
Id.
263. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1) (2003).
264. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003).
265. These disclosures also must be made in connection with third-party tender
offers in accordance with Schedule TO. Id. The term “tender offer” is not defined
in the 1934 Act or the related rules and regulations adopted by the SEC. See HAZEN,
supra note 32, at 486-93 (noting the absence of a statutory and regulatory definition
and describing the SEC’s current eight-factor test); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 819 n.148
(2002) (“The Williams Act does not define the term ‘tender offer,’ leaving its
definition to judicial determination.”); Hon. Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J.
Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 569, 605 (2002) (“Neither the Williams Act nor the SEC defines a
‘tender offer.’”); Michael D. Ebert, Comment: “During the Tender Offer” (or Some Other
Time Near It): Insider Transactions Under the All Holders/Best Price Rule, 47 VILL. L. REV.
677, 678 (2002) (“Because neither Congress nor the SEC has clearly defined the
term ‘tender offer,’ courts have been left to decide when and if a Rule 14d-10
violation has occurred in this non-classic situation.”); Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of
“When” Rather Than “What:” Tender Offers Under the Williams Act and the All Holders and
Best Price Rules, 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 263, 263 (2003) (“Congress left the term ‘tender
offer’ undefined in the Williams Act.”).
266. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1) (2003). It is particularly appropriate to reference
disclosure rules regarding self-tenders in providing guidance on Example #2, since
the directors of the Target in Example #2 purchased (rather than sold) the Target’s
securities while in possession of nonpublic information. The reference would be
similarly apt if Example #2 had related to a stock repurchase by the Target.
Conversely, Example #1 relates to circumstances in which insiders sold securities of
the issuer while in possession of undisclosed information.
267. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003).
268. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003).
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company’s securities; (5) [e]lection of the subject company’s
directors; or (6) [s]ale or other transfer of a material amount of
269
assets of the subject company.” These disclosure requirements are
consistent with, and (from the standpoint of financial impact and
operational impact) arguably more inclusive than those envisioned by
270
the Basic Court in adopting the “probability versus magnitude” test.
With respect to informational currency, the key element of
271
materiality is the passage of time. Time defines both the existence
and continuity of relationships (including insider status) in and
under the federal securities laws and the connection between those
relationships and the required disclosure of information in
accordance with those laws. In fact, time-defined disclosure is an
omnipresent element of mandatory (especially periodic) disclosure
regulation, which calls for disclosure of various items, including
financial information, as of a particular date or for, or during, a
272
particular period of time. In many cases, time is used as a means of
273
limiting the volume of required disclosure. As events become more
distant in time, their importance to the reasonable investor may fade.
Under the facts of Example #2, the informational currency element
of materiality reflects the recognition (acknowledged supra Part II)
that the status of a plan, proposal, or negotiation does not change
overnight simply because the issuer or another party says so; a
reasonable investor would be substantially likely to continue to find
information about a plan, proposal, or negotiation important for a
period of time after that plan, proposal, or negotiation is abandoned
or terminated. In Example #2, then, assuming that Acquiror’s offer is
274
material under the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test when
received by Target, transaction planners and judges may wonder for
269. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003). Note that these disclosures are not required
for issuer tender offers.
270. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-39 (1988) (citing SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) and setting forth basic criteria for evaluating
the magnitude of preliminary merger discussions).
271. As noted below, when analyzing informational currency in Example #2, the
analysis assumes that the premerger discussions between Acquiror and Target were
material at the time they were occurring. The question then becomes when, if ever,
those discussions cease being material.
272. See generally sources noted infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
273. Id.
274. In the exercise of prudence, a premium offer by the Acquiror for the Target
would be treated by the Target as presumptively material, pending the Target’s
response, especially in the insider trading context. See supra notes 261 & 262 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, controllable transactions triggering a duty to
disclose on the part of the Target (e.g., an offering or stock repurchase program)
would be delayed or held in abeyance until the course of conduct between the
parties with respect to the offer is resolved (one way or the other).
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how long the information about an offer for Target remains material
after Target rejects the offer. In other words, when can Target and
its insiders trade in the market without disclosing the offer?
As with the other areas of materiality, there are helpful guideposts
with respect to informational currency in the law and the SEC’s rules
and regulations governing mandatory disclosure. Potentially relevant
time periods under these rules and regulations range from three
months to two years (as described below). Under the SEC’s rules and
regulations, from the perspective of substantive transactional
disclosure regarding acquisitions, the two-year period is highly
275
276
relevant.
As earlier noted, Item 1005(b) of Regulation M-A, as
277
incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO, requires that a thirdparty tender offeror “describe any negotiations, transactions or
material contacts during the past two years between the filing person
[offeror] . . . and the subject company [target] or its affiliates . . .”
278
regarding any one of a number of types of acquisition transaction.
Similarly, in connection with the disclosure of facts regarding the
fairness of a “going private” transaction under Rule 13e-3 under the
279
1934 Act,
Instruction 2 of the instructions to Item 1014 of
280
Regulation M-A provides that
[t]he factors that are important in determining the fairness
of a transaction to unaffiliated security holders and the
weight, if any, that should be given to them in a particular
context will vary. Normally such factors will include, among
others, . . . whether the consideration offered to unaffiliated
security holders constitutes fair value in relation to: . . . (viii)
[f]irm offers of which the subject company or affiliate is
aware made by any unaffiliated person, other than the filing
persons, during the past two years for:
(A) [t]he merger or consolidation of the subject company
with or into another company, or vice versa . . .

281

Moreover, in two court opinions, both responding to motions for
summary judgment, a two-year period after an acquisition offer had

275. Two-year informational currency also is prevalent in periodic financial
disclosures required under Regulation S-X. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 (2003)
(“There shall be filed, for the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated, audited
balance sheets as of the end of each of the two most recent fiscal years.”).
276. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003).
277. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003).
278. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003).
279. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003).
280. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (2003).
281. Id.
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an important role. In each of Caruso v. Metex Corp. and Levinson v.
Basic Inc. (the Basic case, on remand to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
283
the Sixth Circuit), the court found that undisclosed information
about acquisition offers more than two years old is not per se
284
immaterial (in other words, could be material), as a matter of law.
Under the rule of these cases, information about a foregone
acquisition proposal that is under two years old may or may not be
285
material to an acquisition target.
These disclosure measures and cases suggest a possible rule that
provides for the presumptive immateriality, to an acquisition target,
of information regarding an acquisition proposal made and
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned more than two years prior to the
issuer or insider transaction triggering disclosure. Again, the
presumption would be rebuttable based on a group of identified
factors derived from current law and regulation, many of which can
286
be drawn from cases.
But what of nonpublic acquisition proposal
information that is two years old or less? Is an acquisition proposal
per se or presumptively material? If so, until what point in time after it
is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned is it material? Can it be that the
issuer and its insiders cannot trade in the market for two years after
an undisclosed acquisition proposal without some level of security
that information about the proposal is immaterial?
Interestingly, when an issuer provides disclosure in connection
with an issuer tender offer, arguably the transaction most analogous
to the director stock acquisitions in Example #2, the issuer is required
287
to disclose in its Schedule TO only one item related to acquisition
288
289
Pursuant to Item 6 of Schedule TO, the issuer is
proposals.
282. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,967, at 94,130 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992). The
Caruso court stated:
Defendants argue that even if the discussions regarding the acquisition of
D&M were material in 1987, they were no longer material when the merger
occurred in 1989. We find that the issue of whether the $18.5 million buyout
proposal constituted ‘stale’ information in 1989 is a factual question to be
decided by the jury. The jury must determine whether an offer made in 1987
to acquire D&M for $18.5 million ‘would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder . . .’ when deciding whether
to approve the merger in 1989.
Id. (citing Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus. Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1533 (2d Cir. 1991)).
283. 871 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1989).
284. See infra note 285; but see Shahmoon v. Gen. Dev. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 94,308, at 95,038 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1973) (finding two-year-old information
“obviously out of date” and, therefore, immaterial).
285. Caruso, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,143; Levinson, 871 F.2d at 564.
286. The identification of factors is a creative process. SAB No. 99 again may be
helpful here, even if not directly relevant. See supra note 250.
287. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003).
288. The tender offer disclosure regulations under Regulation M-A, like the line-
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required to describe under Item 1006(c) of Regulation M-A any
“plans, proposals, or negotiations that relate to or would result in: . . .
[a]ny extraordinary transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or
liquidation, involving the subject company or any of its subsidiaries;
[or] . . . [a]ny purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of
291
The
assets of the subject company or any of its subsidiaries . . .”
additional Regulation M-A disclosure items referred to above (as well
as others not cited here) are not applicable to issuer disclosures in
292
connection with issuer tender offers.
The absence of these
required disclosures in the issuer tender offer context may indicate
an SEC intention that only current, active acquisition plans,
proposals, and negotiations are material per se, even in a context
where the issuer is trading in its own securities. Perhaps, then, this
mandatory disclosure requirement indicates guidance that presumes
an acquisition proposal is material, subject to rebuttal based on a list
293
of specified factors derived from current law and regulation, for two
294
years after it has been withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned.
However, there are indications elsewhere in the federal securities
regulations and related case law that, as noted above, a reasonable
investor is substantially likely to continue to find information about
an acquisition proposal important for a more limited period of time
295
after that proposal is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned. Should a
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned offer remain per se material for a
period of three months? Is a period of six months more prudent?
Disclosure requirements relating to directors and executive officers
296
in other contexts may give some guidance.
item disclosure regulations under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act generally are qualified
by the additional requirement that the disclosing party “[f]urnish such additional
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not materially misleading.”
17 C.F.R. § 229.1011(b) (2003).
289. 17 C.F.R. § 2240.14d-100 (2003).
290. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c) (2003).
291. Id.
292. See HAZEN, supra note 32, at 517-18 (describing filing and disclosure
requirements applicable to issuer tender offers).
293. Here, factors may include whether the acquisition proposal had been
formally withdrawn by the putative Acquiror, as opposed to it having been rejected
by the target or abandoned. Other factors may be obtained from existing decisional
law.
294. In the interest of completeness, the guidance also should address the
question of when a proposal is deemed withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned.
295. See infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
296. For purposes of this part of the informational currency analysis, directors and
executive officers of a corporation are presumed “insiders” of the corporation. A
review of the reach of basic reporting requirements for these insiders—especially the
extent to which they continue for a period of time after the director or officer ceases
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A possible, albeit weak, justification for a three-month per se
297
materiality period derives from Rule 144 under the 1933 Act. The
298
three-month period regarding affiliate status under Rule 144(k) is
intended to ensure, by the passage of time, that a seller of securities
under the rule that once was an affiliate of the issuer has no
remaining control relationship with the issuer at the time a sale of
299
issuer securities is made by the former affiliate.
The rule assumes
that control no longer exists after three months and, accordingly,
terminates the affiliate’s disclosure obligations under the rule (as
applicable to sales of unrestricted securities and restricted securities
300
held for two years or more at the conclusion of that period).
A possible justification for a six-month per se materiality period
301
derives from Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act (“Section 16(b)”) and
the duration of the related reporting obligations provided for under
302
Under Section 16(b), directors,
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.
303
officers, and ten percent beneficial owners of publicly traded stock
of an issuer are held responsible to the issuer for deemed profits
from a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the issuer’s
304
securities within a six-month period. The liability for these deemed
“short-swing profits” is strict and prophylactic. The express purpose
of the provision is to prevent “the unfair use of information which
[sic] may have been obtained . . . by reason of . . . [the subject
305
person’s] relationship to the issuer.”

to be engaged in a corporate capacity—may be deemed to provide additional
guidance on informational currency. See infra note 297 (regarding a requirement of
this kind in Rule 144(k) under the 1933 Act).
297. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2003). Paragraph (h) of Rule 144 provides, among
other things, for affiliates of an issuer, including its directors, to publicly disclose
their intention to sell the issuer’s securities before sales are made. Id. Paragraph (k)
of Rule 144 effectively provides that those who, at the time of the sale and for three
months prior to the sale, are not affiliates of the issuer’s need not give advance
public warning of their proposed sales of securities other than restricted securities
held for less than two years. Id.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id. Although the three-month rule in Rule 144(k) relates to a change in
status of the insider trader and not a change in the status of the information
possessed by that insider, it remains instructive here, if for no other reason than that
previously required disclosures no longer are required based merely on the passage
of time.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2003).
302. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003).
303. For these purposes, publicly traded stock is stock that is registered under
Section 12 of the 1934 Act.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2003).
305. Id.; see HAZEN, supra note 32, at 710 (“The legislative history reveals
congressional recognition of such a great potential for abuse of inside information so
as to warrant the imposition of strict liability.”).
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Supportive of the six-month strict liability provisions in Section
306
16(b) are the filing requirements of Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.
Under Section 16(a), directors, officers, and ten percent beneficial
owners of publicly traded stock of an issuer must file initial and
periodic reports of beneficial ownership of the issuer’s securities on
Forms 3 and 4, respectively, and also may be required to file an
307
annual report of beneficial ownership on Form 5.
A director or
officer of the issuer is required to report nonexempt transactions in
the issuer’s securities that occur after he or she ceases being a
director or officer of the issuer if those transactions are “[e]xecuted
within a period of less than six months of an opposite transaction
subject to Section 16(b) of the Act that occurred while that person
308
was a director or officer.” Based on the foregoing, it may then be
sufficient to adapt disclosure guidelines that label an acquisition
proposal as (a) per se material during the time it is actively being
considered and for three months or six months after it is withdrawn,
rejected, or abandoned, (b) presumed material after that threemonth or six-month period until two years have passed since the
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which
presumption is rebuttable by the issuer or insider based on a list of
specified factors derived from current law and regulation), and
(c) presumed immaterial after two years have passed since the
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which
presumption is rebuttable by an investor plaintiff, or prosecutor
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law and
regulations).
CONCLUSION
The single uniform legal standard governing materiality, while well
settled, often lacks clarity when applied. Transaction planners,
litigants, the SEC and its staff, representatives of the DOJ, and
judges—each of whom is charged with using this ambiguous standard
in critical decision-making—would benefit from additional guidance
in making materiality determinations, especially in the insider trading
context. The ambiguities inherent in interpreting and applying the
existing materiality standard are not essential to the promotion of
policy objectives underlying U.S. insider trading regulation.
306. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003).
307. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2003).
308. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2003). The note to paragraph (b) explains that “an
acquisition and a disposition each shall be an opposite transaction with respect to the
other.” Id.
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Moreover, the vagueness in the existing materiality standard
negatively impacts stockholder value in a manner that may undercut
those policy objectives (including by the encouragement of expensive
and time-consuming securities class action litigation that is likely to
settle for substantial dollar amounts, regardless of merit).
Fair and honest securities markets, investor confidence in those
markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure in the insider
trading regulation context all can be enhanced by the adoption of
more precise materiality guidance for use in insider trading analysis.
This guidance for determining materiality can be fashioned by
creating a meaningful overarching process for determining
materiality, consistent with existing law, and rigorously applying that
process to common factual settings in various areas of materiality
analysis. If properly crafted, the materiality guidance resulting from
this process would support applicable policy and enhance
predictability and certainty in the ex ante and ex post application of
Rule 10b-5 in the insider trading context. Given the desirability of
fostering market integrity and confidence in the current securities
trading environment, Congress, the SEC, or the courts should take
action to provide enhanced materiality guidance for use by issuers
and insiders as part of a more comprehensive post-Enron agenda.

